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Chapter 1
Braid Group Cryptography
David Garber
Department of Applied Mathematics, Faculty of Sciences,
Holon Institute of Technology,
52 Golomb Street, PO Box 305,
58102 Holon, Israel
E-mail: garber@hit.ac.il
In the last decade, a number of public key cryptosystems based on com-
binatorial group theoretic problems in braid groups have been proposed.
We survey these cryptosystems and some known attacks on them.
This survey includes: Basic facts on braid groups and on the Garside
normal form of its elements, some known algorithms for solving the word
problem in the braid group, the major public-key cryptosystems based on
the braid group, and some of the known attacks on these cryptosystems.
We conclude with a discussion of future directions (which includes also a
description of cryptosystems which are based on other non-commutative
groups).
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1.1. Introduction
In many situations, we need to transfer data in a secure way: credit cards
information, health data, security uses, etc. The idea of public-key cryptog-
raphy in general is to make it possible for two parties to agree on a shared
secret key, which they can use to transfer data in a secure way (see [73]).
There are several known public-key cryptosystems which are based on
the discrete logarithm problem, which is the problem of finding x in the
equation gx = h where g, h are given, and on the factorization problem,
which is the problem of factoring a number to its prime factors: Diffie-
Hellman [38] and RSA [106]. These schemes are used in most of the present-
day applications using public-key cryptography
There are several problems with this situation:
• Subexponential attacks on the current cryptosystems’ un-
derlying problems: Diffie-Hellman and RSA are breakable in
time that is subexponential (i.e. faster than an exponential) in the
size of the secret key [2]. The current length of secure keys is at
least 1000 bits. Thus, the length of the key should be increased
every few years. This makes the encryption and decryption algo-
rithms very heavy.
• Quantum computers: If quantum computers will be imple-
mented in a satisfactory way, RSA will not be secure anymore,
since there are polynomial (in log(n)) run-time algorithms of Peter
Shor [110] which solve the factorization problem and the discrete
logarithm problem. Hence, it solves the problems which RSA and
Diffie-Hellman are based on (for more information, see for example
[3]).
• Too much secure data is transferred in the same method:
It is not healthy that most of the secure data in the world will be
transferred in the same method, since in case this method will be
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broken, too much secure data will be revealed.
Hence, for solving these problems, one should look for a new public-key
cryptosystem which on one hand will be efficient for implementation and
use, and on the other hand will be based on a problem which is different
from the discrete logarithm problem and the factorization problem. More-
over, the problem should have no subexponential algorithm for solving it,
and it is preferable that it has no known attacks by quantum computers.
Combinatorial group theory is a fertile ground for finding hard prob-
lems which can serve as a base for a cryptosystem. The braid group defined
by Artin [7] is a very interesting group from many aspects: it has many
equivalent presentations in entirely different disciplines; its word problem
(to determine whether two elements are equal in the group) is relatively
easy to solve, but some other problems (as the conjugacy problem, decom-
position problem, and more) seem to be hard to solve.
Based on braid group and its problems, two cryptosystems were sug-
gested about a decade ago: by Anshel, Anshel and Goldfeld in 1999 [5] and
by Ko, Lee, Cheon, Han, Kang and Park in 2000 [72]. These cryptosystems
initiated a wide discussion about the possibilities of cryptography in the
braid group especially, and in groups in general.
An interesting point which should be mentioned here is that the conju-
gacy problem in the braid group attracted people even before the cryp-
tosystems on the braid groups were suggested (see, for example, [43;
51]). After the cryptosystems were suggested, some probabilistic solutions
were given [48; 49; 65], but it gave a great push for the efforts to solve the
conjugacy problem theoretically in polynomial time (see [14; 15; 16; 53; 54;
55; 56; 78; 79; 80] and many more).
The potential use of braid groups in cryptography led to additional
proposals of cryptosystems which are based on apparently hard problems in
braid groups (Decomposition problem [113], Triple Decomposition problem
[75], Shifted Conjugacy Search problem [30], and more) and in other groups,
like Thompson Groups [112], polycyclic groups [41] and more. For more
information, see the new book of Myasnikov, Shpilrain and Ushakov [98].
In these notes, we try to survey this fascinating subject. Section 1.2
deals with some different presentations of the braid group. In Section 1.3,
we describe two normal forms for elements in the braid groups. In Section
1.4, we give several solutions for the word problem in the braid group. Sec-
tion 1.5 introduces the notion of public-key cryptography. In Section 1.6,
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the first cryptosystems which are based on the braid group are presented.
Section 1.7 is devoted to the theoretical solution to the conjugacy search
problem, using the different variants of Summit Sets. In Section 1.8, we
describe some more attacks on the conjugacy search problem. In Section
1.9, we discuss some more suggestions for cryptosystems based on the braid
group and their cryptanalysis. Section 1.10 deals with the option of chang-
ing the distribution for choosing a key. In Section 1.11, we deal with some
suggestions for cryptosystems which are based on other non-commutative
groups.
1.2. The braid group
1.2.1. Basic definitions
The braid groups were introduced by Artin [7]. There are several definitions
for these groups (see [13; 107]), and we need two of them for our purposes.
1.2.1.1. Algebraic presentation
Definition 1.1. For n ≥ 2, the braid group Bn is defined by the presenta-
tion:
〈
σ1, . . . , σn−1
∣∣∣∣ σiσj = σjσi for |i− j| ≥ 2σiσi+1σi = σi+1σiσi+1 for |i− j| = 1
〉
. (1.2.1)
This presentation is called the Artin presentation and the generators are
called Artin’s generators.
An element of Bn will be called an n-braid. For each n, the identity
mapping on {σ1, . . . , σn−1} induces an embedding of Bn into Bn+1, so that
we can consider an n-braid as a particular (n + 1)-braid. Using this, one
can define the limit group B∞.
Note that B2 is an infinite cyclic group, and hence it is isomorphic to
the group Z of integers. For n ≥ 3, the group Bn is not commutative and
its center is an infinite cyclic subgroup.
When a group is specified using a presentation, each element of the
group is an equivalence class of words with respect to the congruence gen-
erated by the relations of the presentation. Hence, every n-braid is an
equivalence class of n-braid words under the congruence generated by the
relations in Presentation (1.2.1).
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1.2.1.2. Geometric interpretation
The elements of Bn can be interpreted as geometric braids with n strands.
One can associate with every braid the planar diagram obtained by con-
catenating the elementary diagrams of Figure 1.1 corresponding to the suc-
cessive letters.
−1
i
1 i i+1 n 1 i i+1 n
σ iσ
Fig. 1.1. The geometric Artin generators
A braid diagram can be seen as induced by a three-dimensional figure
consisting on n disjoint curves connecting the points (1, 0, 0), . . . , (n, 0, 0)
to the points (1, 0, 1), . . . , (n, 0, 1) in R3 (see Figure 1.2).
5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4
Fig. 1.2. An example of a braid in B5
Then the relations in Presentation (1.2.1) correspond to ambient isotopy,
that is: to continuously move the curves without moving their ends and
without allowing them to intersect (see Figures 1.3 and 1.4); the converse
implication, i.e., the fact that the projections of isotopic 3-dimensional
figures can always be encoded in words connected by presentation (1.2.1)
was proved by Artin in [7]. Hence, the word problem in the braid group
for the Presentation (1.2.1) is also the braid isotopy problem, and thus it is
closely related to the much more difficult knot isotopy problem.
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41 2
σ 3σ 1
3 4
=
1 2
σ 1σ 3
3
Fig. 1.3. The commutative relation for geometric Artin generators
11σ 1σ 2
1 2 31 2 3
=
σ 2σ 2σσ
Fig. 1.4. The triple relation for geometric Artin generators
1.2.2. Birman-Ko-Lee presentation
Like Artin’s generators, the generators of Birman-Ko-Lee [17] are braids in
which exactly one pair of strands crosses. The difference is that Birman-Ko-
Lee’s generators includes arbitrary transpositions of strands (i, j) instead
of adjacent transpositions (i, i+ 1) in the Artin’s generators. For each t, s
with 1 ≤ s < t ≤ n, define the following element of Bn:
ats = (σt−1σt−2 · · ·σs+1)σs(σ
−1
s+1 · · ·σ
−1
t−2σ
−1
t−1)
See Figure 1.5 for an example (note that the braid ats is an elementary
interchange of the tth and sth strands, with all other strands held fixed,
and with the convention that the strands being interchanged pass in front
of all intervening strands). Such an element is called a band generator.
Note that the usual Artin generator σt is the band generator at+1,t.
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sr
1 r s n
a
Fig. 1.5. The band generator
This set of generators satisfies the following relations (see [17, Proposi-
tion 2.1] for a proof):
• atsarq = arqats if [s, t] ∩ [q, r] = ∅.
• atsasr = atrats = asratr for 1 ≤ r < s < t ≤ n.
For a geometric interpretation of the second relation, see Figure 1.6.
s
= =
1 ntr s 1 ntr s
a ts a sr a atr ts a sr a tr
1 ntr
Fig. 1.6. The second relation of the Birman-Ko-Lee presentation
1.2.2.1. A geometric viewpoint on the difference between presenta-
tions
A different viewpoint on the relation between the two presentations is as
follows: one can think on the braid group as the isotopy classes of boundary-
fixing homeomorphisms on the closed disk Dn ⊂ C2 centered at 0 with n
punctures [7].
In this viewpoint, for presenting the Artin generators, we locate the
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punctures on the real line, and the generator σi is the homeomorphism
which exchanges the points i and i+ 1 along the real line (see Figure 1.7).
61 2 3 4 5
Fig. 1.7. The Artin generator σ3
On the other hand, for illustrating the generators ats of the Birman-Ko-
Lee presentation, let us take the punctures organized as the vertices of a n-
gon contained in the diskDn. Now, the generator ats is the homeomorphism
which exchanges the points t and s along the chord connecting them (see
Figure 1.8).
6
4 1
23
5
Fig. 1.8. The Birman-Ko-Lee generator a63
For more information, see [9; 19].
1.3. Normal forms of elements in the braid group
A normal form of an element in a group is a unique presentation to each
element in the group.
Having a normal form for elements in the group is very useful, since it
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lets us compare two elements, so it gives a solution for the word problem:
Problem 1.1. Given a braid w, does w ≡ ε hold, i.e., does w represent the
unit braid ε (see Figure 1.9)?
Fig. 1.9. The unit braid ε ∈ B5
Since Bn is a group, the above problem is equivalent to the following
problem:
Problem 1.2. Given two braids w,w′, does w ≡ w′ hold, i.e., do w and
w′ represent the same braid?
Indeed, w ≡ w′ is equivalent to w−1w′ ≡ ε, where w−1 is the word obtained
from w by reversing the order of the letters and exchanging σi and σ
−1
i
everywhere.
Also, the normal form gives a canonical representative of each equiva-
lence class.
We present here two known normal forms of elements in the braid group.
For more normal forms, see [20; 31; 40].
1.3.1. Garside normal form
The Garside normal form is initiated in the work of Garside [51], and several
variants have been described in several partly independent papers [1; 37;
43; 44; 121].
We start by defining a positive braid which is a braid which can be
written as a product of positive powers of Artin generators. We denote the
set of positive braids by B+n . This set has a structure of a monoid under
the operation of braid concatenation.
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An important example of a positive braid, which has a central role in
the Garside normal form, is the fundamental braid ∆n ∈ Bn:
∆n = (σ1 · · ·σn−1)(σ1 · · ·σn−2) · · ·σ1
Geometrically, ∆n is the braid on n strands, where any two strands
cross positively exactly once (see Figure 1.10).
4
1
2
3
4
σ 1σ 1σ 2σ 3σ 1σ 2∆ =
Fig. 1.10. The fundamental braid ∆4
The fundamental braid has several important properties:
(1) For any generator σi, we can write ∆n = σiA = Bσi where A,B are
positive braids.
(2) For any generator σi, the following holds:
τ(σi) = ∆
−1
n σi∆n = σn−i
(the inner automorphism τ on Bn is called the shift map).
(3) ∆2n is the generator of the center of Bn.
Now, we introduce permutation braids. One can define a partial order
on the elements of Bn: for A,B ∈ Bn, we say that A is a prefix of B and
write A  B if B = AC for some C in B+n . Its simple properties are:
(1) B ∈ B+n ⇔ ε  B
(2) A  B ⇔ B−1  A−1.
P ∈ Bn is a permutation braid (or a simple braid) if it satisfies: ε  P 
∆n. Its name comes from the fact that there is a bijection between the set
of permutation braids in Bn and the symmetric group Sn (there is a natural
surjective map from Bn to Sn defined by sending i to the ending place of the
strand which starts at position i, and if we restrict ourselves to permutation
braids, this map is a bijection). Hence, we have n! permutation braids.
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Geometrically, a permutation braid is a braid on n strands, where any
two strands cross positively at most once.
Given a permutation braid P , one can define a starting set S(P ) and a
finishing set F (P ) as follows:
S(P ) = {i|P = σiP
′ for some P ′ ∈ B+n }
F (P ) = {i|P = P ′σi for some P
′ ∈ B+n }
The starting set is the indices of the generators which can start a pre-
sentation of P . The finishing set is defined similarly. For example,
S(∆n) = F (∆n) = {1, . . . , n− 1}.
A left-weighted decomposition of a positive braid A ∈ B+n into a sequence
of permutation braids is:
A = P1P2 · · ·Pk
where Pi are permutation braids, and S(Pi+1) ⊂ F (Pi), i.e. any addition
of a generator from Pi+1 to Pi, will convert Pi into a braid which is not a
permutation braid.
Example 1.1. The following braid is left-weighted:
2
1
3
2
σ
2
σ
1
σ
1
σ
The following braid is not left-weighted, due to the circled crossing which
can be moved to the first permutation braid:
1
1
3
2
σ
2
σ
1
σ
2
σ
2
σ
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Now, we show it algebraically:
σ1σ2 · σ2σ1σ2 = σ1σ2 · σ1σ2σ1 = σ1σ2σ1 · σ2σ1
The following theorem introduces the Garside normal form (or left nor-
mal form or greedy normal form) and states its uniqueness:
Theorem 1.2. For every braid w ∈ Bn, there is a unique presentation
given by:
w = ∆rnP1P2 · · ·Pk
where r ∈ Z is maximal, Pi are permutation braids, Pk 6= ε and P1P2 · · ·Pk
is a left-weighted decomposition.
For converting a given braid w into its Garside normal form we have to
perform the following steps:
(1) For any negative power of a generator, replace σ−1i by ∆
−1
n Bi where
Bi is a permutation braid.
(2) Move any appearance of ∆n to the left using the relation:
∆−1n σi∆n = τ(σi) = σn−i. So we get: w = ∆
r′
n A where A is a positive
braid.
(3) Write A as a left-weighted decomposition of permutation braids. The
way to do this is as follows: Take A, and break it into permutation
braids (i.e. we take the longest possible sequences of generators which
are still permutation braids). Then we get: A = Q1Q2 · · ·Qj where
each Qi is a permutation braid. For each i, we compute the finishing
set F (Qi) and the starting set S(Qi+1). In case the starting set is not
contained in the finishing set, we take a generator σ ∈ S(Qi+1)\F (Qi),
and using the relations of the braid group we move it from Qi+1 to
Qi. Then, we get the decomposition A = Q1Q2 · · ·Q′iQ
′
i+1 · · ·Qj . We
continue this process till we have S(Qi+1) ⊆ F (Qi) for every i, and then
we have a left-weighted decomposition as needed. For more details, see
[43] and [56, Proposition 4.2] (in the latter reference, it is done based
on their new idea of local slidings, see Section 1.7.5 below) .
Example 1.2. Let us present the braid w = σ1σ
−1
3 σ2 ∈ B4 in Garside
normal form. First, we should replace σ−13 by: ∆
−1
4 σ3σ2σ1σ3σ2, so we get:
w = σ1 ·∆
−1
4 σ3σ2σ1σ3σ2 · σ2
Now, moving ∆4 to the left yields:
w = ∆−14 · σ3σ3σ2σ1σ3σ2σ2
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Decomposing the positive part into a left-weighted decomposition, we get:
w = ∆−14 · σ2σ1σ3σ2σ1 · σ1σ2
The complexity of transforming a word into a canonical form with re-
spect to the Artin presentation is O(|W |2n logn) where |W | is the length
of the word in Bn [44, Section 9.5].
In a similar way, one can define a right normal form. A right-weighted
decomposition of a positive braid A ∈ B+n into a sequence of permutation
braids is:
A = Pk · · ·P2P1
where Pi are permutation braids, and F (Pi+1) ⊂ S(Pi), i.e. any addition
of a generator from Pi+1 to Pi, will convert Pi into a braid which is not a
permutation braid.
Now, one has the following theorem about the right normal form and
its uniqueness:
Theorem 1.3. For every braid w ∈ Bn, there is a unique presentation
given by:
w = Pk · · ·P2P1∆
r
n
where r ∈ Z, Pi are permutation braids, and Pk · · ·P2P1 is a right-weighted
decomposition.
For converting a given braid w into its right normal form we have to
follow three steps, similar to those of the Garside normal form: We first
replace σ−1i by Bi∆
−1
n . Then, we move any appearance of ∆n to the right
side. Then, we get: w = A∆r
′
n where A is a positive braid. The last step is
to write A as a right-weighted decomposition of permutation braids.
Now we define the infimum and the supremum of a braid w: For w ∈ Bn,
set inf(w) = max{r : ∆rn  w} and sup(w) = min{s : w  ∆
s
n}.
One can easily see that if w = ∆mn P1P2 · · ·Pk is the Garside normal
form of w, then: inf(w) = m, sup(w) = m+ k.
The canonical length of w (or complexity of w), denoted by ℓ(w), is
given by len(w) = sup(w)− inf(w). Hence, if w is given in its normal form,
the canonical length is the number of permutation braids in the form.
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1.3.2. Birman-Ko-Lee canonical form
Based on the presentation of Birman, Ko and Lee [17], they give a new
canonical form for elements in the braid group.
They define a new fundamental word:
δn = an,n−1an−1,n−2 · · ·a2,1 = σn−1σn−2 · · ·σ1
See Figure 1.11 for an example for n = 4.
4
1σ 3σ 2δ =4
1
2
3
σ
Fig. 1.11. The fundamental braid δ4
One can easily see the connection between the new fundamental word
and Garside’s fundamental word ∆n:
∆2n = δ
n
n
The new fundamental word δn has important properties, similar to ∆n:
(1) For any generator asr, we can write δn = asrA = Basr where A,B are
positive braids (with respect to the Birman-Ko-Lee generators)
(2) For any generator asr, the following holds: asrδn = δnas+1,r+1.
Similar to Garside’s normal form of braids, each element of Bn has the
following unique form in terms of the band generators:
w = δjnA1A2 · · ·Ak,
where A = A1A2 · · ·Ak is positive, j is maximal and k is minimal for all
such representations, also the Ai’s are positive braids which are determined
uniquely by their associated permutations (see [17, Lemma 3.1]). Note that
not every permutation corresponds to a canonical factor. We will refer to
Garside’s braids Pi as permutation braids, and to the Birman-Ko-Lee braids
Ai as canonical factors.
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Note that there are Cn =
(2n)!
n!(n+1)! (the nth Catalan number) different
canonical factors for the band-generators presentation [17, Corollary 3.5],
whence there are n! different permutation braids for the Artin presentation.
Since Cn is much smaller than n!, it is sometimes computationally easier
to work with the band-generators presentation than the Artin presentation
(see also Section 1.8.3.2 below).
As in Garside’s normal form, there is an algorithmic way to convert
any braid to this canonical form: we first convert any negative power of a
generator to δ−1n A where A is positive. Then, we move all the δn to the left,
and finally we organize the positive word in a left-weighted decomposition
of canonical factors.
The complexity of transforming a word into a canonical form with re-
spect to the Birman-Ko-Lee presentation is O(|W |2n), where |W | is the
length of the word in Bn [17].
As in Garside’s normal form, one can define infimum, supremum and
canonical length for the canonical form of the Birman-Ko-Lee presentation.
1.4. Algorithms for solving the word problem in braid group
Using ε for the unit word (see Figure 1.9), the word problem is the following
algorithmic problem:
Problem 1.3. Given one braid word w, does w ≡ ε hold, i.e., does w
represent the unit braid ε?
In this section, we will concentrate on some solutions for the word prob-
lem in the braid group.
1.4.1. Dehornoy’s handles reduction
The process of handle reduction has been introduced by Dehornoy [28], and
one can see it as an extension of the free reduction process for free groups.
Free reduction consists of iteratively deleting all patterns of the form xx−1
or x−1x: starting with an arbitrary word w of length m, and no matter on
how the reductions are performed, one finishes in at most m/2 steps with
a unique reduced word, i.e., a word that contains no xx−1 or x−1x.
Free reduction is possible for any group presentation, and in particular
for Bn, but it does not solve the word problem: there exist words that
represent ε ∈ Bn, but do not freely reduce to the unit word. For example,
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the word σ1σ2σ1σ
−1
2 σ
−1
1 σ
−1
2 represents the unit word, but free reductions
can not reduce it any more.
The handle reduction process generalizes free reduction and involves not
only patterns of the form xx−1 or x−1x, but also more general patterns of
the form σi · · ·σ
−1
i or σ
−1
i · · ·σi:
Definition 1.4. A σi-handle is a braid word of the form
w = σeiw0σ
d
i+1w1σ
d
i+1 · · ·σ
d
i+1wmσ
−e
i ,
with e, d = ±1,m ≥ 0, and w0, . . . , wm containing no σ
±1
j with j ≤ i+ 1.
The reduction of w is defined as follows:
w′ = w0σ
−e
i+1σ
d
i σ
e
i+1w1σ
−e
i+1σ
d
i σ
e
i+1 · · ·σ
−e
i+1σ
d
i σ
e
i+1wm,
i.e., we delete the initial and final letters σ±1i , and we replace each letter
σ±1i+1 with σ
−e
i+1σ
±1
i σ
e
i+1 (see Figure 1.12, taken from [29]).
−1
handle
reduction
w
m
w1w0wmw1w0
σ 1 σ 1
Fig. 1.12. An example for a handle reduction (for σ1). The two circled crossings in the
left side are the start and the end of the handle
Note that a braid of the form σiσ
−1
i or σ
−1
i σi is a handle, and hence we
see that the handle reduction process generalizes the free reduction process.
Reducing a braid yields an equivalent braid: as illustrated in Figure
1.12, the (i + 1)th strand in a σi-handle forms a sort of handle, and the
reduction consists of pushing that strand so that it passes above the next
crossings instead of below. So, as in the case of a free reduction, if there
is a reduction sequence from a braid w to ε, i.e., a sequence w = w0 →
w1 → · · · → wN = ε such that, for each k, wk+1 is obtained from wk by
replacing some handle of wk by its reduction, then w is equivalent to ε, i.e.,
it represents the unit word ε.
The following result of Dehornoy [28] shows the converse implication
and the termination of the process of handle reductions:
Prop 1.1. Assume that w ∈ Bn has a length m. Then every reduction
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sequence starting from w leads in at most 2m
4n steps to an irreducible
braid (with respect to Dehornoy’s reductions). Moreover, the unit word ε
is the only irreducible word in its equivalence class, hence w represents the
unit braid if and only if any reduction sequence starting from w finishes
with the unit word.
A braid may contain many handles, so building an actual algorithm
requires to fix a strategy prescribing in which order the handles will be
reduced. Several variants have been considered; as can be expected, the
most efficient ones use a “Divide and Conquer” trick.
For our current purpose, the important fact is that, although the proved
complexity upper bound of the above proposition is very high, handle re-
duction is extremely efficient in practice, even more than the reduction to
a normal form, see [29].
Remark 1.1. In [33], Dehornoy gives an alternative proof for the conver-
gence of the handle reduction algorithm of braids which is both more simple
and more precise than the one in his original paper on handle reductions
[28].
1.4.2. Action on the fundamental group
As we have pointed out at Section 1.2.2.1, the braid group can be thought
of as the isotopy classes of boundary-fixing homeomorphisms on the closed
disk Dn ⊂ C2 centered at 0 with n punctures p1, . . . , pn [7]. It means that
two elements are the same if their actions on π1(Dn \ {p1, . . . , pn}, u) are
equal.
In [47], we propose the following solution for the word problem: we start
with a geometric base for π1(Dn \ {p1, . . . , pn}, u) presented in Figure 1.13.
Now, we apply the two braids on this initial geometric base. If the
resulting bases are the same up to isotopy, it means that the braids are
equal, otherwise they are different.
In Figure 1.14, there is a simple example of two equal braids which
result the same base.
This algorithm is very quick and efficient for short words, but its worst
case is exponential. For more details on its implementation, see [47].
For more solutions for the word problem for the braid groups, see [39].
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Fig. 1.13. A geometric base
2 :
σ 1 σ 2 σ 1
σ 2σ 1σ 2
σ 1 :σ 2σ 1
σ 1σ 2σ
Fig. 1.14. An example of applications of two equal braids σ1σ2σ1 = σ2σ1σ2 on the
initial geometric base
1.5. What is Public-Key Cryptography?
The idea of Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) was invented by Diffie and
Hellman [38]. At the heart of this concept is the idea of using a one-way
function for encryption (see the survey paper of Koblitz and Menezes [73]).
The functions used for encryption belong to a special class of one-way
functions that remain one-way only if some information (the decryption
key) is kept secret. If we use informal terminology, we can define a public-
key encryption function as a map from plain text message units to cipher-
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text message units that can be feasibly computed by anyone having the
public key, but whose inverse function (which deciphers the ciphertext mes-
sage units) cannot be computed in a reasonable amount of time without
some additional information, called the private key.
This means that everyone can send a message to a given person using the
same enciphering key, which can simply be looked up in a public directory
whose contents can be authenticated by some means. There is no need for
the sender to have made any secret arrangement with the recipient; indeed,
the recipient need never have had any prior contact with the sender at all.
Some of the purposes for which public-key cryptography has been ap-
plied are:
• Confidential message transmission: Two people want to exchange
messages in the open airwaves, in such a way that an intruder observing
the communication cannot understand the messages.
• Key exchange or Key agreement: Two people using the open air-
waves want to agree upon a secret key for use in some symmetric-key
cryptosystem. The agreement should be in such a way that an intruder
observing the communication cannot deduce any useful information
about their shared secret.
• Authentication: The prover wishes to convince the verifier that he
knows the private key without enabling an intruder watching the com-
munication to deduce anything about his private key.
• Signature: The target in this part is: The sender of the message
has to send the receiver a (clear or ciphered) message together with
a signature proving the origin of the message. Each signature scheme
may lead to an authentication scheme: in order to authenticate the
sender, the receiver can send a message to the sender, and require that
the sender signs this message.
Now, we give some examples of the most famous and well-known public-
key cryptosystems.
1.5.1. Diffie-Hellman
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [38] introduced a key-exchange protocol which
is based on the apparent difficulty of computing logarithms over a finite field
Fq with q elements and on some commutative property of the exponent.
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Their key-exchange protocol works as follows:
Protocol 1.5.
Public keys: q and a primitive element α.
Private keys: Alice: Xi; Bob: Xj .
Alice: Sends Bob Yi = α
Xi (mod q).
Bob: Sends Alice Yj = α
Xj (mod q)
Shared secret key: Kij = α
XiXj (mod q)
Kij is indeed a shared key since Alice can compute Kij = Y
Xi
j (mod q)
and Bob can compute Kij = Y
Xj
i (mod q).
This method is secured due to the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm
Problem.
1.5.2. RSA
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [106] introduced one of the most famous and
common cryptosystem, which is called RSA. This method is widely used in
commerce.
Find two large prime numbers p and q, each about 100 decimal digits
long. Let n = pq and φ = φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1) (the Euler number). Choose
a random integer E between 3 and φ that has no common factors with φ.
It is easy to find an integer D that is the ”inverse” of E modulo φ, that is,
D · E differs from 1 by a multiple of φ.
Alice makes E and n public. All the other quantities here are kept
secret.
The encryption is done as follows: Bob, who wants to send a plain text
message P to Alice, that is an integer between 0 and n− 1, computes the
ciphertext integer C = PE (mod n). (In other words, raise P to the power
E, divide the result by n, and C is the remainder). Then, Bob sends C to
Alice.
For decrypting the message, Alice uses the secret decryption number D
for finding the plain text P by computing: P = CD (mod n).
This method is currently secure, since in order to determine the secret
decryption key D (for decrypting the message), the intruder should factor
the 200 or so digits number n, which is a very hard task.
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1.6. First cryptosystems which are based on the braid
groups
In this section, we describe first cryptosystems which are based on the braid
groups. We start with the definition of some apparently hard problems
which the cryptosystems are based on. After that, we describe first two
key-exchange protocols which are based on the braid group. We finish the
section with some more cryptosystems based on the braid group.
1.6.1. Underlying problems for cryptosystems in the braid
group
We list here several apparently hard problems in the braid group, which
are the base of many cryptosystems in the braid group:
• Conjugacy Decision Problem: Given u,w ∈ Bn, determine whether
they are conjugate, i.e., there exists v ∈ Bn such that
w = v−1uv
• Conjugacy Search Problem: Given conjugate elements
u,w ∈ Bn, find v ∈ Bn such that
w = v−1uv
• Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem:
Givenm pairs of conjugate elements (u1, w1), . . . , (um, wm) ∈ Bn which
are all conjugated by the same element. Find v ∈ Bn such that
wi = v
−1uiv, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
• Decomposition Problem: u 6∈ G ≤ Bn. Find x, y ∈ G such that
w = xuy.
1.6.2. Key-exchange protocols based on the braid group
In this section, we present two key-exchange protocols which are based on
apparently hard problems in the braid group. After the transmitter and
receiver agree on a shared secret key, they can use a symmetric cryptosystem
for transmitting messages in the insecure channel.
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1.6.2.1. Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-exchange protocol
The following scheme was proposed theoretically by Anshel, Anshel and
Goldfeld [5], and implemented in the braid group by Anshel, Anshel, Fisher
and Goldfeld [4].
This scheme assumes that the Conjugacy Search Problem is difficult
enough (so this scheme, as well as the other schemes described below, would
keep its interest, even if it turned out that braid groups are not relevant,
since it might be implemented in other groups).
Let G be a subgroup of Bn:
G = 〈g1, . . . , gm〉, gi ∈ Bn
The secret keys of Alice and Bob are words a ∈ G and b ∈ G respectively.
The key-exchange protocol is as follows:
Protocol 1.6.
Public keys: {g1, . . . , gm} ⊂ Bn.
Private keys: Alice: a; Bob: b.
Alice: Sends Bob publicly the conjugates: ag1a
−1, . . . , agma
−1.
Bob: Sends Alice publicly the conjugates: bg1b
−1, . . . , bgmb
−1.
Shared secret key: K = aba−1b−1
K is indeed a shared key, since if a = x1 · · ·xk where xi = g
±1
j for
some j, then Alice can compute ba−1b−1 = (bx−1k b
−1) · · · (bx−11 b
−1) and
hence Alice knows K = a(ba−1b−1). Similarly, Bob can compute aba−1,
and hence he knows K = (aba−1)b−1 .
The security is based on the difficulty of a variant to the Conjugacy
Search Problem in Bn, namely the Multiple Conjugacy Search Problem, in
which one tries to find a conjugating braid starting not from one single
pair of conjugate braids (g, aga−1), but from a finite family of such pairs
(g1, ag1a
−1), . . . , (gm, agma
−1) obtained using the same conjugating braid.
It should be noted that the Multiple Conjugacy Search Problem may be
easier than the original Conjugacy Search Problem.
In [4], it is suggested to work in B80 with m = 20 and short initial
braids gi of length 5 or 10 Artin generators.
Remark 1.2. We simplified a bit the protocol given by Anshel-Anshel-
Goldfeld, but the principle remains the same. Moreover, in their protocol,
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they used not the braids themselves, but their images under the colored
Burau representation of the braid group defined by Morton [95] (see Section
1.8.4.1 below).
1.6.2.2. Diffie-Hellman-type key-exchange protocol
Following the commutative idea for achieving a shared secret key of Diffie-
Hellman, Ko et al. [72] propose a key-exchange protocol based on the braid
group and some commutative property of some of its elements. Although
braid groups are not commutative, we can find large subgroups such that
each element of the first subgroup commutes with each element of the sec-
ond. Indeed, braids involving disjoint sets of strands commute. Similar
approach appears also in the Algebraic Eraser Scheme (see [6] and Section
1.9.4 here).
Note that this scheme was proposed independently in [118] in the con-
text of a general, unspecified noncommutative semigroup with difficult con-
jugacy problem, but the braid groups were not mentioned there explicitly.
Denote by LBn (resp. UBn) the subgroup of Bn generated by
σ1, . . . , σm−1 (resp. σm+1, . . . , σn−1) with m = ⌊
n
2 ⌋. Then, every braid
in LBn commutes with every braid in UBn.
Here is Ko et al. key-exchange protocol:
Protocol 1.7.
Public key: one braid p in Bn.
Private keys: Alice: s ∈ LBn; Bob: r ∈ UBn.
Alice: Sends Bob p′ = sps−1.
Bob: Sends Alice p′′ = rpr−1
Shared secret key: K = srpr−1s−1
K is a shared key since Alice can compute K = sp′′s−1 and Bob can
compute K = rp′r−1, and both are equal to K since s and r commute.
The security is based on the difficulty of the Conjugacy Search Problem
in Bn, or, more exactly, on the difficulty of the following variant, which can
be called the Diffie-Hellman-like Conjugacy Problem:
Problem 1.4. Given a braid p in Bn, and the braids p
′ = sps−1 and
p′′ = rpr−1, where s ∈ LBn and r ∈ UBn, find the braid rp′r−1, which is
also sp′′s−1.
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The suggested parameters are n = 80, i.e. to work in B80, with braids
specified using (normal) sequences of length 12, i.e., sequences of 12 per-
mutation braids (see [23]).
1.6.3. Encryption and decryption
The following scheme is proposed by Ko et al. [72]. We continue with the
same notation of Ko et al. Assume that h is a public collision-free one-way
hash function of Bn to {0, 1}
N, i.e., a computable function such that the
probability of having h(b2) = h(b1) for b2 6= b1 is negligible (collision-free),
and retrieving b from h(b) is infeasible (one-way) (for some examples see
Dehornoy [29, Section 4.4] and Myasnikov [99]).
We start with p ∈ Bn and s ∈ LBn. Alice’s public key is the pair (p, p′)
with p′ = sps−1, where s is Alice’s private key. For sending the message
mB, which we assume lies in {0, 1}N, Bob chooses a random braid r in UBn
and he sends the encrypted text m′′B = mB ⊕ h(rp
′r−1) (using ⊕ for the
Boolean operation ”exclusive-or”, i.e. the sum in Z/2Z), together with the
additional datum p′′ = rpr−1. Now, Alice computes mA = m
′′⊕h(sp′′s−1),
and we have mA = mB, which means that Alice retrieves Bob’s original
message.
Indeed, because the braids r and s commute, we have (as before):
sp′′s−1 = srpr−1s−1 = rsps−1r−1 = rp′r−1,
and, therefore, mA = mB ⊕ h(rp′r−1)⊕ h(rp′r−1) = mB.
The security is based on the difficulty of the Diffie-Hellmann-like Con-
jugacy Problem in Bn. The recommended parameters are as in Ko et al’s
exchange-key protocol (see Section 1.6.2.2).
1.6.4. Authentication schemes
Three authentication schemes were introduced by Sibert, Dehornoy and
Girault [117], which are based on the Conjugacy Search problem and Root
Extraction Problem. Concerning the cryptanalysis of the Root Extraction
Problem, see [63].
We present here their first scheme. This scheme is related to Diffie-
Hellman based exchange-key in its idea of verifying that the secret key
computed at the two ends is the same.
Note that any encryption scheme can be transformed into an authenti-
cation scheme, by sending to Alice both an encrypted version and a hashed
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image of the same message m, then requesting her to reply with the deci-
phered messagem (she will do it only if the hashed image of the deciphered
message is the same as the one sent by Bob).
Their first scheme is based on the difficulty of Diffie-Hellman-like Con-
jugacy Problem. It uses the fact that braids involving disjoint families of
strands commute. The data consist of a public key, which is a pair of braids,
and of Alice’s private key, also a braid. We assume that n is even, and de-
note by LBn (resp. UBn) the subgroup of Bn generated by σ1, . . . , σn
2
−1,
i.e., braids where the n2 lower strands only are braided (resp. in the sub-
group generated by σn
2
+1, . . . , σn−1). The point is that every element in
LBn commutes with every element in UBn, and alternative subgroups with
this property could be used instead. We assume that H is a fixed collision-
free hash function from braids to sequences of 0’s and 1’s or, possibly, to
braids.
• Phase 1. Key generation:
(1) Choose a public braid b in Bn such that the Diffie-Hellman-like
Conjugacy Problem for b is hard enough;
(2) Alice chooses a secret braid s in LBn, her private key; she pub-
lishes b′ = sbs−1; the pair (b, b′) is her public key.
• Phase 2. Authentication phase:
(1) Bob chooses a braid r in UBn, and sends the challenge x = rbr
−1
to Alice;
(2) Alice sends the response y = H(sxs−1) to Bob, and Bob checks
y = H(rb′r−1).
For active attacks, the security is ensured by the hash function H: if H
is one-way, these attacks are ineffective.
Two more authentication schemes were suggested by Lal and Chaturvedi
[76]. Their cryptanalysis are discussed in [63; 122].
1.7. Attacks on the conjugacy search problem using Summit
Sets
In this section, we explain the algorithms for solving the Conjugacy Decision
Problem and the Conjugacy Search Problem (CDP/CSP) in braid groups
which are based on Summit sets. These algorithms are given in [51; 43; 44;
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46; 53; 55]. We start with the basic idea, and then we continue with its
implementations.
We follow here the excellent presentation of Birman, Gebhardt and
Gonza´lez-Meneses [14]. For more details, see their paper.
1.7.1. The basic idea
Given an element x ∈ Bn, the algorithm computes a finite subset Ix of the
conjugacy class of x which has the following properties:
(1) For every x ∈ Bn, the set Ix is finite, non-empty and only depends on
the conjugacy class of x. It means that two elements x, y ∈ Bn are
conjugate if and only if Ix = Iy .
(2) For each x ∈ Bn, one can compute efficiently a representative x˜ ∈ Ix
and an element a ∈ Bn such that a−1xa = x˜.
(3) There is a finite algorithm which can construct the whole set Ix from
any representative x˜ ∈ Ix.
Now, for solving the CDP/CSP for given x, y ∈ Bn we have to perform
the following steps.
(a) Find representatives x˜ ∈ Ix and y˜ ∈ Iy.
(b) Using the algorithm from property (3), compute further elements of Ix
(while keeping track of the conjugating elements), until either:
(i) y˜ is found as an element of Ix, proving x and y to be conjugate and
providing a conjugating element, or
(ii) the entire set Ix has been constructed without encountering y˜, prov-
ing that x and y are not conjugate.
We now survey the different algorithms based on this approach.
In Garside’s original algorithm [51], the set Ix is the Summit Set of x,
denoted SS(x), which is the set of conjugates of x having maximal infimum.
Remark 1.3. All the algorithms presented below for the different types of
Summit Sets work also for Garside groups (defined by Dehornoy and Paris
[36]), which are a generalization of the braid groups. In our survey, for
simplification, we present them in the language of braid groups. For more
details on the Garside groups and the generalized algorithms, see [14].
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1.7.2. The Super Summit Sets
The Summit Set are improved by El-Rifai and Morton [43], who consider
Ix = SSS(x), the Super Summit Set of x, consisting of the conjugates of x
having minimal canonical length ℓ(x). They also show that SSS(x) is the
set of conjugates of x having maximal infimum and minimal supremum,
at the same time. El-Rifai and Morton [43] show that SSS(x) is finite. In
general, SSS(x) is much smaller than SS(x). For example, take the element
x = ∆4σ1σ1 ∈ B4, SSS(x) = {∆4 · σ1σ3} while
SS(x) = {∆4 · σ1σ3,∆4 · σ1 · σ1,∆4 · σ3 · σ3}
(the factors in each left normal form are separated by a dot) [14, page 8].
Starting by a given element x, one can find an element x˜ ∈ SSS(x) by
a sequence of special conjugations, called cyclings and decyclings:
Definition 1.8. Let x = ∆px1 · · ·xr ∈ Bn be given in Garside’s normal
form and assume r > 0.
The cycling of x, denoted by c(x) is:
c(x) = ∆px2 · · ·xrτ
−p(x1),
where τ is the involution which maps σi to σn−i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The decycling of x, denoted by d(x) is:
d(x) = xr∆
px1x2 · · ·xr−1 = ∆
pτp(xr)x1x2 · · ·xr−1.
If r = 0, we have c(x) = d(x) = x.
Note that c(x) = (τ−p(x1))
−1x(τ−p(x1)) and d(x) = x
−1
r xxr . This
means that for an element of positive canonical length, the cycling of x is
computed by moving the first permutation braid of x to the end, while the
decycling of x is computed by moving the last permutation braid of x to
the front. Moreover, for every x ∈ Bn, inf(x) ≤ inf(c(x)) and sup(x) ≥
sup(d(x)).
Note that the above decompositions of c(x) and d(x) are not, in general,
Garside’s normal forms. Hence, if one wants to perform iterated cyclings
or decyclings, one needs to compute the left normal form of the resulting
element at each iteration.
Given x, one can use cyclings and decyclings to find an element in
SSS(x) in the following way: Suppose that we have an element x ∈ Bn
such that inf(x) is not equal to the maximal infimum in the conjugacy
class of x. Then, we can increase the infimum by repeated cycling (due to
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[18; 43]): there exists a positive integer k1 such that inf(c
k1 (x)) > inf(x).
Therefore, by repeated cycling, we can conjugate x to another element xˆ of
maximal infimum. Once xˆ is obtained, if the supremum is not minimal in
the conjugacy class, we can decrease its supremum by repeated decycling.
Again, due to [18; 43], there exists an integer k2 such that sup(d
k2(xˆ)) <
sup(xˆ). Hence, using repeated cycling and decycling a finite number of
times, one obtains an element in SSS(x).
If we denote by m the length of ∆ in Artin generators and r is the
canonical length of x, then we have (see [18; 43]):
Prop 1.2. A sequence of at most rm cyclings and decyclings applied to x
produces a representative x˜ ∈ SSS(x).
Now, we have to explore all the set SSS(x). We have the following result
(see [43]):
Prop 1.3. Let x ∈ Bn and V ⊂ SSS(x) be non-empty. If V 6= SSS(x), then
there exist y ∈ V and a permutation braid s such that s−1ys ∈ SSS(x) \V .
Since SSS(x) is a finite set, the above proposition allows us to compute
the whole SSS(x). More precisely, if one knows a subset V ⊂ SSS(x) (we
start with: V = {x˜}), one conjugates each element in V by all permutation
braids (n! elements). If one encounters a new element z with the same
canonical length as x˜ (which is a new element in SSS(x)), then add z to V
and start again. If no new element is found, this means that V = SSS(x),
and we are done.
One important remark is that this algorithm not only computes the set
SSS(x), but it also provides conjugating elements joining the elements in
SSS(x).
Now the checking if x and y are conjugate, is done as follows: Compute
representatives x˜ ∈ SSS(x) and y˜ ∈ SSS(y). If inf(x˜) 6= inf(y˜) or sup(x˜) 6=
sup(y˜), then x and y are not conjugate. Otherwise, start computing SSS(x)
as described above. The elements x and y are conjugate if and only if y˜ ∈
SSS(x). Note that if x and y are conjugate, an element conjugating x to y
can be found by keeping track of the conjugations during the computations
of x˜, y˜ and SSS(x). Hence, it solves the Conjugacy Decision Problem and
the Conjugacy Search Problem simultaneously.
From the algorithm, we see that the computational cost of computing
SSS(x) depends mainly in two ingredients: the size of SSS(x) and the num-
ber of permutation braids. In Bn, all known upper bounds for the size of
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SSS(x) are exponential in n, although it is conjectured that for fixed n, a
polynomial bound in the canonical length of x exists [44].
Franco and Gonza´lez-Meneses [46] reduce the size of the set we have to
conjugate with, by the following observation:
Prop 1.4. Let x ∈ Bn and y ∈ SSS(x). For every positive braid u
there is a unique -minimal element cy(u) satisfying u  cy(u) and
(cy(u))
−1y(cy(u)) ∈ SSS(x).
Definition 1.9. Given x ∈ Bn and y ∈ SSS(x), we say that a permutation
braid s 6= 1 is minimal for y with respect to SSS(x) if s−1ys ∈ SSS(x), and
no proper prefix of s satisfies this property.
It is easy to see that the number of minimal permutation braids for y
is bounded by the number of Artin’s generators.
Now, we have:
Prop 1.5. Let x ∈ Bn and V ⊆ SSS(x) be non-empty. If V 6= SSS(x),
then there exist y ∈ V and a generator σi such that cy(σi) is a minimal
permutation braid for y, and (cy(σi))
−1y(cy(σi)) ∈ SSS(X) \ V .
Using these proposition, the SSS(x) can be computed as in [43], but
instead of conjugating each element y ∈ SSS(x) by all permutation braids
(n! elements), it suffices to conjugate y by the minimal permutation braids
cy(σi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, n− 1 elements).
Figure 1.15 (taken from [29]) summarizes the solution of the conjugacy
problem using the Super Summit Set for an element b.
Note that the algorithm computes a directed graph whose vertices are
the elements in SSS(x), and whose arrows are defined as follows: for any
two elements y, z ∈ SSS(x), there is an arrow labeled by the minimal per-
mutation braid pi starting at y and ending at z if p
−1
i ypi = z.
An example for such a graph can be seen in Figure 1.16, for the set
SSS(σ1) in B4 (taken from [14, pp. 10–11]). Note that there are exactly 3
arrows starting at every vertex (the number of Artin generators of B4). In
general, the number of arrows starting at a given vertex can be smaller or
equal, but never larger than the number of generators.
Hence, the size of the set of permutation braids is no longer a problem for
the complexity of the algorithm (since we can use the minimal permutation
braids instead), but there is still a big problem to handle: The size of SSS(x)
is, in general, very big. The next improvement tries to deal with this.
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Fig. 1.16. The graph of SSS(σ1) in B4
1.7.3. The Ultra Summit Sets
Gebhardt [53] defines a small subset of SSS(x) satisfying all the good prop-
erties described above, so that a similar algorithm can be used to compute
it. The definition of this new subset appears after observing that the cy-
cling function maps SSS(x) to itself. As SSS(x) is finite, iterated cycling of
any representative of SSS(x) must eventually become periodic. Hence it is
natural to define the following:
Definition 1.10. Given x ∈ Bn, the Ultra Summit Set of x, USS(x), is the
set of elements y ∈ SSS(x) such that cm(y) = y for some m > 0.
Hence, the Ultra Summit Set USS(x) consists of a finite set of disjoint
orbits, closed under cycling (see some schematic example in Figure 1.17).
April 16, 2009 22:45 World Scientific Review Volume - 9in x 6in BGC˙lecture˙notes˙final
32 David Garber
Fig. 1.17. Action of cycling inside the Super Summit Set; the elements of the Ultra
Summit Set are in black and perform some orbits under cycling (taken from [29, Figure
4])
Example 1.3. [14] One has
USS(σ1) = SSS(σ1) = SS(σ1) = {σ1, . . . , σn−1},
and each element corresponds to an orbit under cycling, since c(σi) = σi
for i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
A more interesting example is given by the element
x = σ1σ3σ2σ1 · σ1σ2 · σ2σ1σ3 ∈ B4.
In this example, USS(x) has 6 elements, while SSS(x) has 22 elements.
More precisely, USS(x) consists of 2 closed orbits under cycling: USS(x) =
O1 ∪O2, each one containing 3 elements:
O1 =


σ1σ3σ2σ1 · σ1σ2 · σ2σ1σ3,
σ1σ2 · σ2σ1σ3 · σ1σ3σ2σ1,
σ2σ1σ3 · σ1σ3σ2σ1 · σ1σ2

 ,
O2 =


σ3σ1σ2σ3 · σ3σ2 · σ2σ3σ1,
σ3σ2 · σ2σ3σ1 · σ3σ1σ2σ3,
σ2σ3σ1 · σ3σ1σ2σ3 · σ3σ2

 .
Notice that O2 = τ(O1).
Note also that the cycling of every element in USS(x) gives another
element which is already in left normal form, hence iterated cyclings cor-
responds to cyclic permutations of the factors in the left normal form.
Elements which satisfies this property are called rigid (see [14]).
Remark 1.4. The size of the Ultra Summit Set of a generic braid of canon-
ical length ℓ is either ℓ or 2ℓ [53]. This means that, in the generic case,
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Ultra Summit Sets consist of one or two orbits (depending on whether
τ(O1) = O1 or not), containing rigid braids. But, there are exceptions: for
example, the following braid in B12:
E = (σ2σ1σ7σ6σ5σ4σ3σ8σ7σ11σ10) · (σ1σ2σ3σ2σ1σ4σ3σ10) ·
·(σ1σ3σ4σ10) · (σ1σ10) · (σ1σ10σ9σ8σ7σ11) · (σ1σ2σ7σ11)
has an Ultra Summit Set of size 264, instead of the expected size 12 (see
[15, Example 5.1]).
In the case of braid groups, the size and structure of the Ultra Summit
Sets happen to depend very much on the geometrical properties of the
braid, more precisely, on its Nielsen-Thurston type: periodic, reducible or
Pseudo-Anosov (see [14; 15]).
The algorithm given in [53] to solve the CDP/CSP in braid groups
(using Ultra Summit Sets) is analogous to the previous ones, but this time
one needs to compute USS(x) instead of SSS(x). In order to do this, we
first have to obtain an element xˆ ∈ USS(x). We do this as follows: take
an element x˜ ∈ SSS(x). Now, start cycling it. Due to the facts that
cycling an element in SSS(x) will result in another element in SSS(x) and
that the Super Summit Set of x is finite, we will have two integers m1,m2
(m1 < m2), which satisfy:
cm1(x˜) = cm2(x˜)
When having this, the element xˆ = cm1(x˜) is in USS(x), since:
cm2−m1(xˆ) = xˆ.
After finding a representative xˆ ∈ USS(x), we have to explore all the
set USS(x). This we do using the following results of Gebhardt [53] (which
are similar to the case of the Super Summit Set):
Prop 1.6. Let x ∈ Bn and y ∈ USS(x). For every positive braid
u there is a unique -minimal element cy(u) satisfying u  cy(u) and
(cy(u))
−1y(cy(u)) ∈ USS(x).
Definition 1.11. Given x ∈ Bn and y ∈ USS(x), we say that a per-
mutation braid s 6= 1 is a minimal for y with respect to USS(x) if
s−1ys ∈ USS(x), and no proper prefix of s satisfies this property.
It is easy to see that the number of minimal permutation braids for y
is bounded by the number of Artin’s generators.
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Now, we have:
Prop 1.7. Let x ∈ Bn and V ⊆ USS(x) be non-empty. If V 6= USS(x),
then there exist y ∈ V and a generator σi such that cy(σi) is a minimal
permutation braid for y, and (cy(σi))
−1y(cy(σi)) ∈ USS(X) \ V .
In [53], it is shown how to compute the minimal permutation braids
(they are called there minimal simple elements in the Garside group’s lan-
guage) corresponding to a given y ∈ USS(x) (a further discussion on the
minimal simple elements with some examples can be found in [15]). Hence,
one can compute the whole USS(x) starting by a single element xˆ ∈ USS(x),
and then we are done.
For a better characterization of the minimal permutation braids, let us
introduce some notions related to a braid given in a left normal form (see
[15]):
Definition 1.12. Given x ∈ Bn whose left normal form is
x = ∆px1 · · ·xr (r > 0), we define the initial factor of x as
ι(x) = τ−p(x1), and the final factor of x as ϕ(x) = xr. If r = 0 we
define ι(∆p) = 1 and ϕ(∆p) = ∆.
Definition 1.13. Let u, v be permutation braids such that uv = ∆. The
right complement of u, ∂(u), is defined by ∂(u) = u−1∆ = v.
Note that a cycling of x is actually a conjugation of x by the initial factor
ι(x): c(x) = ι(x)−1xι(x), and a decycling of x is actually a conjugation of
x by the inverse of final factor ϕ(x)−1: d(x) = ϕ(x)xϕ(x)−1 .
The notions of Definition 1.12 are closely related (see [14]):
Lemma 1.1. For every x ∈ Bn, one has ι(x
−1) = ∂(ϕ(x)) and ϕ(x−1) =
∂−1(ι(x)).
The following proposition from [15] characterizes the minimal permuta-
tion braids for x as prefixes of x or of x−1:
Prop 1.8. Let x ∈ USS(x) with ℓ(x) > 0 and let cx(σi) be a minimal
permutation braid for x. Then cx(σi) is a prefix of either ι(x) or ι(x
−1), or
both.
As in the case of the Super Summit Set, the algorithm of Gebhardt
[53] not only computes USS(x), but also a graph Γx, which determines the
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conjugating elements. This graph is defined as follows.
Definition 1.14. Given x ∈ Bn, the directed graph Γx is defined by the
following data:
(1) The set of vertices is USS(x).
(2) For every y ∈ USS(x) and every minimal permutation braid s for y
with respect to USS(x), there is an arrow labeled by s going from y to
s−1ys.
Example 1.4. Let us give some example for the graph Γx. We follow [15,
Example 2.10].
Let x = σ1σ2σ3σ2 · σ2σ1σ3 · σ1σ3 ∈ B4. This braid A is Pseudo-Anosov
and rigid. A computation shows that USS(x) has exactly two cycling orbits,
with 3 elements each, namely:
x1 =


x1,1 = σ1σ2σ3σ2 · σ2σ1σ3 · σ1σ3,
x1,2 = σ2σ1σ3 · σ1σ3 · σ1σ2σ3σ2,
x1,3 = σ1σ3 · σ1σ2σ3σ2 · σ2σ1σ3

 ,
x2 =


x2,1 = σ1σ3σ2σ1 · σ2σ1σ3 · σ1σ3,
x2,2 = σ2σ1σ3 · σ1σ3 · σ1σ3σ2σ1,
x2,3 = σ1σ3 · σ1σ3σ2σ1 · σ2σ1σ3

 .
The graph Γx of USS(x) is illustrated in Figure 1.18. The solid ar-
rows are conjugations by minimal permutation braids which are prefixes
of the initial factors, while the dashed arrows are conjugations by minimal
permutation braids which are prefixes of the final factors. Note that the
definitions imply that the cycles x1 and x2 of USS(x) are connected by
solid arrows.
Concerning the complexity of this algorithm for solving the Conjugacy
Search Problem, the number m2 of times one needs to apply cycling for
finding an element in USS(x) is not known in general. Nevertheless, in
practice, the algorithm based on the Ultra Summit Set is substantially bet-
ter for braid groups (see [14]). For more information on the Ultra Summit
Set and its structure, see [15].
Remark 1.5. One might think that for a given element x ∈ Bn, it is
possible that its Ultra Summit Set with respect to the Garside normal
form will be different from its Ultra Summit Set with respect to the right
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Fig. 1.18. The graph of USS(σ1σ2σ3σ2σ2σ1σ3σ1σ3) ⊂ B4
normal form (see Section 1.3.1). If this happens, it is possible that even
though one of the Ultra Summit Sets is large, the other will be small.
Gebhardt and Gonza´lez-Meneses [54] show that at least for rigid braids,
the size of the above two Ultra Summit Sets is equal, and their associated
graphs are isomorphic (a braid w is called rigid, if the cycling of w, c(w),
is already given in Garside normal form, with no need for changing the
permutation braids; see also [14, Section 3] and Example 1.3 here). They
conjecture that this is the situation for any braid.
1.7.4. Some variants of the Ultra Summit Sets
In this section, we sketch some variants of the Super Summit Sets and the
Ultra Summit Sets suggested by several authors.
1.7.4.1. Reduced Super Summit Sets
Lee, in his thesis [81] (2000), suggests a variant of the Super Summit Set,
which is actually a subset of the Ultra Summit Set which was defined later
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(2005) by Gebhardt:
Definition 1.15. The Reduced Super Summit Set of x, denote by RSSS(x),
is:
RSSS(x) = {y ∈ C(x)|cm(y) = y and dn(y) = y for some m,n ≥ 1}.
where C(x) is the conjugacy class of x
Lee’s motivation to look on RSSS(x) comes from the facts that it is still
easy to find algorithmically an element in RSSS(x) for a given x, this set
is invariant under cyclings and decyclings, and this set is usually smaller
than SSS(x).
Indeed, it is easy to see (by [43] and [55]) that:
RSSS(x) ⊆ USS(x) ⊆ SSS(x)
Lee indicates that there is no known algorithm to generate RSSS(x)
without generating SSS(x) before. Despite this, he has succeeded to com-
pute RSSS(x) in polynomial time for the case of rigid braids in B4.
1.7.4.2. A general cycling operation and its induced set
Zheng [126] suggests to generalize the idea of cyclings. He defines:
Definition 1.16. The cycling operation of order q on x is the conjugation
cq(x) = s
−1xs, where s is the maximal common prefix of x and ∆q. (this
will be denoted in the next section as: s = x ∧∆q).
The corresponding set is:
Gq = {x ∈ Bn | c
N
q (x) = x for some N > 0}.
The new cycling operations are indeed natural generalizations of the
cycling and decycling operation:
c(x) = τ−inf(x)
(
cinf(x)+1(x)
)
, d(x) = csup(x)−1(x).
Recall that C(x) is the conjugacy class of x. For getting the Super
Summit Sets and the Ultra Summit Sets in the language of Gq, we define:
infs(x) = max{inf(y) | y ∈ C(x)}, sups(x) = min{sup(y) | y ∈ C(x)}.
Hence, we get that:
SSS(x) = C(x) ∩

 ⋂
q∈{infs(x),sups(x)}
Gq

 ,
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USS(x) = C(x) ∩

 ⋂
q∈{infs(x),infs(x)+1,sups(x)}
Gq

 .
Zheng [126] defines a new summit set:
C∗(x) = C(x) ∩

⋂
q∈Z
Gq

 = C(x) ∩

 ⋂
infs(x)≤q≤sups(x)
Gq

 .
It is straight-forward that:
C∗(x) ⊆ USS(x) ⊆ SSS(x).
Given an element x, computing an element xˆ ∈ C∗(x) is done by apply-
ing iterated general cyclings cq until getting repetitions, for inf(x) < q <
sup(x). A more complicated algorithm is presented for finding the whole
C∗(x) (see [126, Algorithm 3.8]). Having these ingredients for C∗(x), we
can solve the Conjugacy Search Problem based on C∗(x).
Zheng [126, Section 6] presents some computational results, and he em-
phasizes that the new set C∗(x) is important especially for the case of
reducible braids, where there are cases that USS(x) = SSS(x).
1.7.4.3. Stable Super Summit Sets and Stable Ultra Summit Sets
The stable Super Summit Sets and stable Ultra Summit Sets were defined
simultaneously by Birman, Gebhardt and Gonza´lez-Meneses [14] and Lee
and Lee [78]:
Definition 1.17. Given x ∈ Bn, The stable Super Summit Set of x is
defined as:
SSSS(x) = {y ∈ USS(x) | ym ∈ USS(xm), ∀m ∈ Z}.
The stable Ultra Summit Set of x is defined as:
SU(x) = {y ∈ USS(x) | ym ∈ USS(xm), ∀m ∈ Z}.
Birman, Gebhardt and Gonza´lez-Meneses [14, Proposition 2.23] and Lee
and Lee [78, Theorem 6.1(i)] have proved that for every x ∈ Bn the stable
sets SSSS(x) and SU(x) are non-empty.
We give here an example from [78], which shows that: (i) the stable
Super Summit Set is different from both the Super Summit Set and the
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Ultra Summit Set; (ii) one cannot obtain an element of the stable Super
Summit Set by applying only cyclings and decyclings.
Example 1.5. [78, page 11] Consider the positive 4-braid monoid B+4 . Let
g1 = σ1σ2σ3, g2 = σ3σ2σ1, g3 = σ1σ3σ2, g4 = σ2σ1σ3.
Note that gi’s are permutation braids and conjugate to each other.
It is easy to see that
SSS(g1) = USS(g1) = {g1, g2, g3, g4}.
Now, we show that the stable Super Summit Set of g1 is different from the
Super/Ultra Summit Set of g1. The normal forms of g
2
i are as follows:
g21 = (σ1σ2σ3σ1σ2)σ3; g
2
2 = (σ3σ2σ1σ3σ2)σ1; g
2
3 = ∆; g
2
4 = ∆.
Therefore, inf(g21) = inf(g
2
2) = 0 and inf(g
2
3) = inf(g
2
4) = 1. Hence,
SSSS(g1) = {g3, g4}.
Note that ck(gi) = d
k(gi) = gi for i = 1, . . . , 4 and all k > 1. In particular,
we cannot obtain an element of the stable Super Summit Set by applying
only cyclings and decyclings to g1 or g2.
A finite-time algorithm for computing the stable Super Summit Sets
(i.e. when given x ∈ Bn, first compute an element xˆ ∈ SSSS(x) and then
compute the whole set SSSS(x)) is given by Lee and Lee in [80, Section 6].
Birman, Gebhardt and Gonza´lez-Meneses [14, page 27] remark that
their proof for the non-emptiness of the stable Ultra Summit Set (Proposi-
tion 2.23 there) actually yields an algorithm for computing this set.
Zheng [126], as a continuation of his idea of general cyclings, suggests
to generalize also the stable sets. He defines:
Definition 1.18. cp,q(x) = s
−1xs, where s is the maximal common prefix
of xp and ∆q (i.e., s = xp ∧∆q).
The corresponding set is:
Gp,q = {x ∈ Bn | c
N
p,q(x) = x for some N > 0}.
Note that cq(x
p) = (cp,q(x))
p, so applying a cq operation on x
p is
equivalent to applying a cp,q operation on x. In particular, x
p ∈ Gq if and
only if x ∈ Gp,q.
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Similarly, one can define:
C [m,n],∗(x) = C(x) ∩

 ⋂
m≤p≤n,q∈Z
Gp,q

 .
Zheng claims, that with a suitable modification, the algorithms for com-
puting C∗(x) can be used to compute the set C [m,n],∗(x).
An even more generalized set is:
C∗,∗(x) = C(x) ∩

 ⋂
p,q∈Z
Gp,q

 ,
but currently there is no algorithm for computing it, because he does not
know how to bound the order p. Nevertheless, Zheng [126, Theorem 7.3]
have proved that the set C∗,∗(x) is nonempty.
The set C∗,∗(x) is indeed a generalization of the stable sets, since:
SSSS(x) = C(x) ∩

 ⋂
p≥1,q∈{infs(xp),sups(x
p)}
Gp,q

 ,
SU(x) = C(x) ∩

 ⋂
p≥1,q∈{infs(xp),infs(xp)+1,sups(x
p)}
Gp,q

 .
By the non-emptiness result of Zheng, we have an alternative proof that
the stable sets are nonempty.
1.7.5. Cyclic sliding
The last step up-to-date for seeking a polynomial-time solution to the conju-
gacy search problem has been done by Gebhardt and Gonza´lez-Meneses [55;
56].
Their idea is introducing a new operation, called cyclic sliding, and
they suggest to replace the usual cycling and decycling operations by this
new one, as it is more natural from both the theoretical and computational
points of view. Then, the Ultra Summit Set USS(x) of x, will be replaced by
its analogue for cyclic sliding: the set of sliding circuits, SC(x). The sets of
sliding circuits and their elements naturally satisfy all the good properties
that were already shown for Ultra Summit Sets, and sometimes even better
properties: For example, for elements of canonical length 1, cycling and
decycling are trivial operations, but cyclic sliding is not.
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One more advantage of considering the set SC(x) is that it yields a
simpler algorithm to solve the Conjugacy Decision Problem and the Con-
jugacy Search Problem in the braid group. The worst case complexity of
the algorithm is not better than the previously known ones [53], but it is
conceptually simpler and easier to implement. The details of the imple-
mentation and the study of complexity are presented in [56].
For any two braids u, v, let us denote u ∧ v to be the largest common
prefix of u and v (the notation comes from the corresponding operation
on the lattice generated by the partial order  on the elements of Bn, see
Section 1.3.1).
The following is an interesting observation:
Observation 1.19. Given two permutation braids u and v, the decompo-
sition u · v is left-weighted if ∂(u) ∧ v = ε or, equivalently, if uv ∧ ∆ = u.
The condition ∂(u) ∧ v = ε actually means that if we move any crossing
from v to u, then u will not be anymore a permutation braid.
By this observation, it is easy to give a procedure to find the left-
weighted factorization of the product of two permutation braids u and v
as follows. If the decomposition uv is not left-weighted, this means that
there is a nontrivial prefix s  v such that us is still a permutation braid
(i.e. s  ∂(u)). The maximal element which satisfies this property is
s = ∂(u) ∧ v. Therefore, for transforming the decomposition uv into a
left-weighted one, we have to slide the prefix s = ∂(u) ∧ v from the second
factor to the first one. That is, write v = st and then consider the decom-
position uv = (us)t, with us as the first factor and t as the second one. The
decomposition us · t is left-weighted by the maximality of s. This action
will be called local sliding (see Figure 1.19).
Motivated by the idea of local sliding, one wants now to do a cycling
in the same manner. Given a braid in a left normal form x = ∆px1 · · ·xr,
we want now to slide a part of x1 to xr. This will be done by conjugating
a prefix of τ−p(x1). The appropriate prefix is: ∂(xr) ∧ τ−p(x1), which is
equal to: ι(x−1)∧ι(x). Hence, Gebhardt and Gonza´lez-Meneses [55] define:
Definition 1.20. Given x ∈ Bn, define the cyclic sliding s(x) of x as the
conjugate of x by p(x) = ι(x−1) ∧ ι(x), that is:
s(x) = p(x)−1xp(x).
By a series of results, Gebhardt and Gonza´lez-Meneses [55, Section 3,
Results 3.4-3.10] show that the cyclic sliding is indeed a generalization
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t
local sliding
u v
s tu
u s
Fig. 1.19. An illustration of a local sliding
of cycling and decycling, and the fact that for every x ∈ Bn, iterated
application of cyclic sliding eventually reaches a period, that is, there are
integers N ≥ 0 and M > 0 such that sM+N (x) = sN (x).
Now, one can define the set of sliding circuits of x:
Definition 1.21. An element y ∈ Bn belongs to a sliding circuit if sm(y) =
y for some m ≥ 1.
Given x ∈ Bn, the set of sliding circuits of x, denoted by SC(x), is the
set of all conjugates of x which belong to a sliding circuit.
Note that SC(x) does not depend on x but only on its conjugacy class.
Hence, two elements x, y ∈ Bn are conjugate if and only if SC(x) = SC(y).
Therefore, the computation of SC(x) and of one element of SC(y) will solve
the Conjugacy Decision Problem in Bn.
The set SC(x) is usually much smaller than USS(x). For example, for
B12 ∋ x = σ7σ8σ7σ6σ5σ4σ9σ8σ7σ6σ5σ4σ3σ2σ10σ9σ8σ7σ6σ5σ4σ3 ·
·σ2σ1σ11σ10σ9σ8σ7σ6σ5σ4σ3σ2σ1
we have that |SC(x)| = 6, but |SSS(x)| = |USS(x)| = 126498 (see [55,
Section 5], based on an example from [57]). On the other hand, the size of
the set SC(x) still might be exponential in the length of x (for example, if
δ = σn−1 · · ·σ1 ∈ Bn, one has |SC(δ)| = 2n−2 − 2 [55, Proposition 5.1]).
Gebhardt and Gonza´lez-Meneses have proved [55, Proposition 3.13]
that:
SC(x) = RSSS(x)
for x satisfying ℓs(x) > 1 (where ℓs(x) = sups(x)−infs(x), i.e. the canonical
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length of elements in the Super Summit Set of x), and
SC(x) ⊆ RSSS(x)
for x satisfying ℓs(x) = 1, and in general SC(x) is a proper subset of RSSS(x)
in this case.
They remark that the case ℓs(x) = 1 in which the sets differ is not
irrelevant, since, for example, a periodic braid x which is not conjugate to
a power of ∆ has ℓs(x) = 1, but the conjugacy problem for such braids is
far from being easy [16].
As in the previous Summit Sets, the algorithm to solve the CDP/CSP
in braid groups (using sliding circuits) starts by obtaining an element xˆ ∈
SC(x). We do this as follows: take an element x. Now, apply iterated cyclic
sliding on it. Due to the periodic property of the sliding operation, we will
have two integers m1,m2 (m1 < m2), which satisfy:
s
m1(x) = sm2(x).
When having this, the element xˆ = sm1(x) is in SC(x), since:
s
m2−m1(xˆ) = xˆ.
After finding a representative xˆ ∈ SC(x), we have to explore all the set
SC(x). This we do in a similar way to the Ultra Summit Set case: There
are -minimal elements which conjugate an element in SC(x) to another
element there. The number of such possible minimal conjugators for a given
element in SC(x) is bounded by the number of Artin generators). Hence,
one can compute the whole SC(x) starting by a single element xˆ ∈ SC(x),
and then we are done (for more information, see [55, Section 4.1] and [56])
Again, as in the previous Summit Sets, the algorithm of Gebhardt and
Gonza´lez-Meneses [55] not only computes SC(x), but also a graph SCG(x),
which determines the conjugating elements. This graph is defined as fol-
lows.
Definition 1.22. Given x ∈ Bn, the directed graph SCG(x) is defined by
the following data:
(1) The set of vertices is SC(x).
(2) For every y ∈ SC(x) and every minimal permutation braid s for y with
respect to SC(x), there is an arrow labeled by s going from y to s−1ys.
More information about these sorts of Summit sets can be found in the
series of papers [14; 15; 16] and [77; 78; 80].
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1.7.6. An updated summary of the theoretical solution for
the conjugacy search problem
In this section, we give an updated summary for the current status of the
complexity of the theoretical solution for the Conjugacy Search Problem.
We follow here the nice presentation of Gonza´lez-Meneses in his talk at
Singapore (2007) [59].
As already mentioned, according to Nielsen-Thurston geometric classi-
fication (based on [102] and [120]), there are three types of braids: periodic
braids, reducible braids and pseudo-Anosov braids.
A braid α is called periodic if there exist integers k,m such that αk =
∆2m. A braid α is called reducible if it preserves a family of curves, called
a reduction system. A braid is called pseudo-Anosov if it is neither periodic
nor reducible.
For the case of periodic braids, Birman, Gebhardt and Gonza´lez-
Meneses [16] present a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the conjugacy
search problem. Almost at the same time, Lee and Lee [79] suggest another
entirely different solution for this case.
For the case of reducible braids, there is a result of Gebhardt and
Gonza´lez-Meneses [59] that these braids fall into exactly two cases:
(1) The braid α is conjugate to a braid with a standard reducing curve,
which means that the reducing curves are round circles, and hence the
Conjugacy Search Problem can be decomposed into smaller problems
(inside the tubes).
There is only one problem here: the conjugate braid (with a standard
reducing curve) is in USS(α), and for reaching it, one has to make an
unknown number of cycling/decycling (or sliding) steps.
(2) The braid α is rigid (i.e. a cycling of the Garside normal form of α is
left-weighted as written, or alternatively, it is a fixed point with respect
to cyclic slidings).
For the case of pseudo-Anosov braids: Due to a result of Birman,
Gebhardt and Gonza´lez-Meneses [14, Corollary 3.24], there exists a small
power of a pseudo-Anosov braid which is conjugate to a rigid braid. Another
result [58] claims that in the case of pseudo-Anosov braids, the conjugating
elements of the pair (x, y) and the pair (xm, ym) coincide, and hence instead
of solving the Conjugacy Search Problem in the pair (x, y), one can solve
it in the pair (xm, ym). Therefore, one can restrict himself to the case of
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rigid braids.
If we summarize all cases, we get that the main challenges in this direc-
tion are:
(1) Solve the Conjugacy Search Problem for rigid braids in polynomial
time.
(2) Given a braid x, find a polynomial bound for the number of cy-
cling/decycling steps one has to perform for reaching an element in
USS(x).
1.8. More attacks on the conjugacy search problem
There are some more ways to attack the Conjugacy Search Problem, apart
of solving it completely. In this section, we present some techniques to
attack the Conjugacy Search Problem without actually solving it theoreti-
cally.
1.8.1. A heuristic algorithm using the Super Summit Sets
Hofheinz and Steinwandt [65] use a heuristic algorithm for attacking the
Conjugacy Search Problem which is the basis of the cryptosystems of
Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld [4] and Ko et al. [72].
Their algorithm is based on the idea that it is probable that if we start
with two elements in the same conjugacy class, their representatives in the
Super Summit Set will not be too far away, i.e. one representative is a
conjugation of the other by a permutation braid.
So, given a pair (x, x′) of braids, where x′ = s−1xs, we do the following
steps:
(1) By a variant of cycling (adding a multiplication by ∆ to the first per-
mutation braid, based on [82, Proposition 1]) and decycling, we find
x˜ ∈ SSS(x) and x˜′ ∈ SSS(x′).
(2) Try to find a permutation braid P , such that x˜′ = P−1x˜P .
In case we find such a permutation braid P , since we can follow after the
conjugators in the cycling/decycling process, at the end of the algorithm
we will have at hand the needed conjugator for breaking the cryptosystem.
Note that we do not really need to find exactly s, since each s˜ which satisfies
x′ = s˜−1xs˜ will do the job as well and reveal the shared secret key.
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Their experiments show that they succeed to reveal the shared secret
key in almost 100% of the cases in the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocol
(where the cryptosystem is based on the Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy
Problem) and in about 80% of the cases in the Diffie-Hellman-type protocol.
Note that their attack is special to cryptosystems which are based on
the conjugacy problem, since it depends very much on the fact that x and
x′ are conjugate.
1.8.2. Reduction of the Conjugacy Search Problem
Maffre [87; 88] presents a deterministic, polynomial algorithm that reduces
the Conjugacy Search Problem in braid group.
The algorithm is based on the decomposition of braids into products of
canonical factors and gives a partial factorization of the secret: a divisor
and a multiple. The tests which were performed on different keys of existing
protocols showed that many protocols in their current form are broken and
that the efficiency of the attack depends on the random generator used to
create the key.
1.8.3. Length-based attacks
A different probabilistic attack on the braid group cryptosystems is the
length-based attack. In this section, we will sketch its basic idea, and differ-
ent variants of this attack on the braid group cryptosystems. We finish this
section with a short discussion about the applicability of the length-based
attack to other groups.
1.8.3.1. The basic idea
The basic idea was introduced by Hughes and Tannenbaum [67].
Let ℓ be a length function on the braid group Bn. In the Conjugacy
Search Problem, we have an instance of (p, p′) where p′ = s−1ps, and we
look for s. The idea of a probabilistic length-based attack to this problem
is: if we can write s = s′σi for a given i, then the length ℓ(σis
−1psσ−1i )
should be strictly smaller than the length ℓ(σjs
−1psσ−1j ) for j 6= i.
Thus, for using such an attack, one should choose a good length function
on Bn and run it iteratively till we get the correct conjugator.
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1.8.3.2. Choosing a length function
In [49], we suggest some length functions for this purposes. The first option
is the Garside length, which is the length of the Garside normal form by
means of Artin generators (i.e. if w = ∆rnP1P2 · · ·Pk, then ℓGar(w) = r|∆|+
|P1|+ |P2|+ · · ·+ |Pk|).
A better length function is the Reduced Garside length (which is called
Mixed Garside length in [44]). The motivation for this length function is
that a part of the negative powers of ∆n can be canceled with the positive
permutation braids. Hence, it is defined as follows: if w = ∆−rn P1P2 · · ·Pk,
then:
ℓRedGar(w) = ℓGar(w)− 2
min{r,k}∑
i=1
|Pi|.
This length function is much more well-behaved, and hence it gives better
performances. But even this length function did not give a break of the
cryptosystems (by the basic length-based attack).
In [64], Hock and Tsaban checked the corresponding length functions
for the Birman-Ko-Lee presentation, and they found out that the reduced
length function with respect to the Birman-Ko-Lee presentation behaves
even better than the reduced Garside length function.
1.8.3.3. The memory approach
The main contribution of [48] is new improvements to the length-based
attack.
First, it introduces a new approach which uses memory: In the basic
length-based attack, we hold each time only the best conjugator so far.
The problem with this is that sometimes a prefix of the correct conjugator
is not the best conjugator at some iteration and hence it is thrown out.
In such a situation, we just miss the correct conjugator in the way, and
hence the length-based algorithm fails. Moreover, even if we use a ’look
ahead’ approach, which means that instead of adding one generator in each
iteration we add several generators in each iteration, we still get total failure
for the suggested parameters, and some success for small parameters [49].
In the memory approach, we hold each time a given number (which is
the size of the memory) of possible conjugators which are the best among
all the other conjugators of this length. In the next step, we add one more
generator to all the conjugators in the memory, and we choose again only
the best ones among all the possibilities. In this approach, in a successful
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search, we will often have the correct conjugator in the first place of the
memory.
The results of [48] show that the length-based attack with memory is
applicable to the cryptosystems of Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld and Ko et al,
and hence their cryptosystems are not secure. Moreover, the experiments
show that if we increase the size of the memory, the success rate of the
length-based attack with memory becomes higher.
1.8.3.4. A different variant of Length-based attack by Myasnikov
and Ushakov
Recently, Myasnikov and Ushakov [100] suggested a different variant of the
length-based approach.
They start by mentioning the fact that the geodesic length, i.e. the
length of the shortest path in the corresponding Cayley graph, seems to
be the best candidate for a length function in the braid group, but there
is no known efficient algorithm for computing it. Moreover, it was shown
by Paterson and Razborov [104] that the set of geodesic braids in Bn is
co-NP complete. On the other hand, many other length functions are bad
for the length-based attacks (like the canonical length, which is the number
of permutation braids in the Garside normal form).
As a length function, they choose some approximation function for the
geodesic length: they use Dehornoy’s handles reduction and conjugations
by ∆ (this length function appears in [96; 97]). This length function satisfies
|a−1ba| > |b| for almost all a and b.
Next, they identify a type of braid word, which they call peaks, which
causes problems to the Length-based attacks:
Definition 1.23. Let G be a group, and let ℓG be a length function on G,
and H = 〈w1, . . . , wk〉. A word w = wi1 · · ·win is called an n-peak in H
relative to ℓG if there is no 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 such that
ℓG(wi1 · · ·win) ≥ ℓG(wi1 · · ·wij ).
An example of a commutator-type peak is given in [100, Example 1]:
if a1 = σ
−1
39 σ12σ7σ
−1
3 σ
−1
1 σ70σ25σ
−1
24 and a2 = σ42σ
−1
56 σ8σ
−1
18 σ19σ73σ
−1
33 σ
−1
22
then their commutator is a peak: a−11 a
−1
2 a1a2 = σ7σ
−1
8 .
The main idea behind their new variant of the Length-based attack is
to add elements from the corresponding subgroup to cut the peaks. By
an investigation of the types of peaks, one can see that this is done by
adding to the vector of elements all the conjugators and commutators of
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its elements. By this way, the Length-based attack will be more powerful.
For more information and for an exact implementation, see [100].
1.8.3.5. Applicability of the length-based approach
One interesting point about the length-based approach is that it is applica-
ble not only for the Conjugacy Search Problem, but also for solving equa-
tions in groups. Hence, it is a threat also to the Decomposition Problem
and for the Shifted Conjugacy Problem which was introduced by Dehornoy
(see [30] and Section 1.9.3 below).
Moreover, the length-based approach is applicable in any group which
has a reasonable length function, e.g. the Thompson group, as indeed has
been done by Ruinskiy, Shamir and Tsaban (see [108] and Section 1.11.1.2
below).
1.8.4. Attacks based on linear representations
A different way to attack these cryptographic schemes is by using linear
representations of the braid groups. The basic idea is to map the braid
groups into groups of matrices, in which the Conjugacy Search Problem is
easy. In this way, we might solve the Conjugacy Search Problem of Bn by
lifting the element from the group of matrices back to the braid group Bn.
For more information on the linear representations of the braid group,
we refer the reader to the surveys of Birman and Brendle [13] and Paris
[103].
1.8.4.1. The Burau representations
The best known linear representation of the braid group Bn is the Burau
representation [21]. We present it here (we partially follow [82]).
The Burau representation is defined as follows. Let Z[t±1] be the ring
of Laurent polynomials f(t) = akt
k + ak+1t
k+1 + · · · + amtm with integer
coefficients (and possibly with negative degree terms). Let GLn(Z[t
±1]) be
the group of n×n invertible matrices over Z[t±1]. The Burau representation
is a homomorphism Bn → GLn(Z[t±1]) which sends a generator σi ∈ Bn
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to the matrix: 

1
. . .
1− t t
1 0
. . .
1


∈ GLn(Z[t
±1]),
where 1− t occurs in row and column i of the matrix.
This representation is reducible, since it can be decomposed into the
trivial representation of dimension 1 and an irreducible representation
Bn → GLn−1(Z[t±1]) of dimension n − 1, called the reduced Burau rep-
resentation, which sends a generator σi ∈ Bn to the matrix:
Ci(t) =


1
. . .
1
t −t 1
1
. . .
1


∈ GLn−1(Z[t
±1]),
where t occurs in row i of the matrix. If i = 1 or i = n− 1, the matrix is
truncated accordingly (see [82]).
Note that these matrices satisfy the braid group’s relations:
Ci(t)Cj(t) = Cj(t)Ci(t) for |i− j| > 2
Ci(t)Ci+1(t)Ci(t) = Ci+1(t)Ci(t)Ci+1(t) for i = 1, . . . , n− 1
The Burau representation of Bn is faithful for n = 3 and it is known
to be unfaithful for n ≥ 5 (i.e. the map from Bn to the matrices is not
injective) [93; 94; 83; 10]. The case of n = 4 remains unknown. In the case
of n ≥ 5, the kernel is very small [123], and the probability that different
braids admit the same Burau image is negligible.
Here is a variant of the Burau representation introduced by Morton [95].
The colored Burau matrix is a refinement of the Burau matrix by assign-
ing σi to Ci(ti+1), so that the entries of the resulting matrix have several
variables. This naive construction does not give a group homomorphism.
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Thus the induced permutations are considered simultaneously. We label
the strands of an n-braid by t1, . . . , tn, putting the label tj on the strand
which starts from the jth point on the right.
Now we define:
Definition 1.24. Let a ∈ Bn be given by a word σ
e1
i1
· · ·σekik , ej = ±1. Let
tjr be the label of the under-crossing strand at the rth crossing. Then the
colored Burau matrix Ma(t1, . . . , tn) of a is defined by
Ma(t1, . . . , tn) =
k∏
r=1
(Cir (tjr ))
er .
The permutation group Sn acts on Z[t
±1
1 , . . . , t
±1
n−1] from left by changing
variables: for α ∈ Sn, α(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(tα(1), . . . , tα(n)). Then Sn also
acts on the matrix group GLn−1(Z[t
±1
1 , . . . , t
±1
n ]) entry-wise: for α ∈ Sn
and M = (fij), then α(M) = (α(fij)). Then we have
Definition 1.25. The colored Burau group CBn is:
Sn ×GLn−1(Z[t
±1
1 , . . . , t
±1
n ])
with multiplication (α1,M1) · (α2,M2) = (α1α2, (α
−1
2 M1)M2). The col-
ored Burau representation C : Bn → CBn is defined by C(σi) = ((i, i +
1), Ci(ti+1)).
It is easy to see the following:
(1) CBn is a group, with identity element (e, In−1) and (α,M)
−1 =
(α−1, αM−1),
(2) C(σi)’s satisfy the braid relations and so C : Bn → CBn is a group
homomorphism.
(3) for a ∈ Bn, C(a) = (πa,Ma), where πa is the induced permutation and
Ma is the colored Burau matrix.
Using the Burau representation, the idea of Hughes [66] to attack the
Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld scheme [4; 5] is as follows: take one or several pairs
of conjugate braids (p, p′) associated with the same conjugating braids.
Now, it is easy to compute their classical Burau image and to solve the
Conjugate Search Problem in the linear group.
In general, this is not enough for solving the Conjugate Search Problem
in Bn, because there is no reason for the conjugating matrix that has been
found to belong to the image of the Burau representation, or that one can
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find a possible preimage. Since the kernel of the classical Burau represen-
tation is small [123], there is a non-negligible probability that we will find
the correct conjugator and hence we break the cryptosystem.
In a different direction, Lee and Lee [82] indicate a weakness in the
Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocol in a different point. Their shared key is
the colored Burau representation of a commutator element.
The motivation for this attack is that despite the change of variables
in the colored Burau matrix by permutations, the matrix in the final out-
put, which is the shared key, is more manageable than braids. They show
that the security of the key-exchange protocol is based on the problems of
listing all solutions to some Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Problems in
a permutation group and in a matrix group over a finite field. So if both
of the two listing problems are feasible, then we can guess correctly the
shared key, without solving the Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Problem
in braid groups.
Note that Lee-Lee attack is special to this protocol, since it uses the
colored Burau representation of a commutator element, instead of using
the element itself. In case we change the representation in the protocol,
this attack is useless.
1.8.4.2. The Lawrence-Krammer representation
The Lawrence-Krammer representation is another linear representation of
Bn, which is faithful [11; 74]. It associates with every braid in Bn a matrix
of size
(
n
2
)
with entries in a 2-variable Laurent polynomial ring Z[t±1, q±1].
Cheon and Jun [24] develop an attack against the scheme of Diffie-
Hellman-type protocol based on the Lawrence-Krammer representation: as
in the case of the Burau representation, it is easy to compute the images of
the involved braids in the linear group and to solve the Conjugacy Problem
there, but in general, there is no way to lift the solution back to the braid
groups.
But, since we only have to find a solution to the derived Diffie-Hellman-
like Conjugacy Problem:
Problem 1.5. Given p, sps−1 and rpr−1, with r ∈ LBn and s ∈ UBn, find
(rs)p(rs)−1.
Taking advantage of the particular form of the Lawrence-Krammer ma-
trices, which contain many 0’s, Cheon and Jun obtain a solution with a
polynomial complexity and they show that, for the parameters suggested
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by Ko et al. [72], the procedure is doable, and so the cryptosystem is not
secure.
1.9. Newly suggested braid group cryptosystems, their
cryptanalysis and their future applications
In this section, we present recent updates on some problems in the braid
group, on which one can construct a cryptosystem. We also discuss some
newly suggested braid group cryptosystems.
1.9.1. Cycling problem as a potential hard problem
In their fundamental paper, Ko et al. [72] suggested some problems which
can be considered as hard problems, on which one can construct a cryp-
tosystem. One of the problems is the Cycling Problem:
Problem 1.6. Given a braid y and a positive integer t such that y is in
the image of the operator ct. Find a braid x such that ct(x) = y.
Maffre, in his thesis [86], shows that the Cycling Problem for t = 1 has
a very efficient solution. That is, if y is the cycling of some braid, then one
can find x such that c(x) = y very fast.
Following this result, Gebhardt and Gonza´les-Meneses [54] have shown
that the general Cycling Problem has a polynomial solution. The reason
for that is the following result: The cycling operation is surjective on the
braid group [54]. Hence, one can easily find the tth preimage of y under
this operation.
Note that the decycling operation and cyclic sliding operation are sur-
jective too (the decycling operation is a composition of surjective maps:
d(x) = (τ(c(x−1)))−1, and the cyclic sliding operation can be written as a
composition of a cycling and a decycling [55, Lemma 3.8]). Hence, these
problems cannot be considered as hard problems, on which one can con-
struct a cryptosystem [60].
It will be interesting to find new operations on the braid group which
their solution can be consider as an hard problem, on which one can con-
struct a cryptosystem.
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1.9.2. A cryptosystem based on the shortest braid problem
A different type of problem consists in finding the shortest words represent-
ing a given braid (see Dehornoy [29, Section 4.5.2]). This problem depends
on a given choice of a distinguished family of generators for Bn, e.g., the
σi’s or the band generators of Birman-Ko-Lee.
We consider this problem in B∞ which is the group generated by an
infinite sequences of generators {σ1, σ2, . . . } subject to the usual braid re-
lations.
The Minimal Length Problem (or Shortest Word Problem) is:
Problem 1.7. Starting with a word w in the σ±1i ’s, find the shortest word
w′ which is equivalent to w, i.e., that satisfies w′ ≡ w.
This problem is considered to be hard due to the following result of
Paterson and Razborov [104]:
Prop 1.9. The Minimal Length Problem (in Artin’s presentation) is co-
NP-complete.
This suggests introducing new schemes in which the secret key is a short
braid word, and the public key is another longer equivalent braid word. It
must be noted that the NP-hardness result holds in B∞ only, but it is not
known in Bn for fixed n.
The advantage of using an NP-complete problem lies in the possibility
of proving that some instances are difficult; however, from the point of view
of cryptography, the problem is not to prove that some specific instances
are difficult (worst-case complexity), but rather to construct relatively large
families of provably difficult instances in which the keys may be randomly
chosen.
Based on some experiments, Dehornoy [29] suggests that braids of the
form w(σe11 , σ
e2
2 , . . . , σ
en
n ) with ei = ±1, i.e., braids in which, for each i, at
least one of σi or σ
−1
i does not occur, could be relevant.
The possible problem of this approach is that the shortest word problem
inBn for a fixed n is not so hard. InB3, there is polynomial-time algorithms
for the shortest word problem (see [8] and [124] for the presentation by the
Artin generators and [125] for the presentation by band generators). Also,
this problem was solved in polynomial time inB4 for the presentation by the
band generators ([70] and [81, Chapter 5]). For small fixed n, Wiest [124]
conjectures for an efficient algorithm for finding shortest representatives in
Bn. Also, an unpublished work [50] indicates that a heuristic algorithm
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based on a random walk on the Cayley graph of the braid group might give
good results in solving the Shortest Word Problem.
In any case, a further research is needed here in several directions:
(1) Cryptosystem direction: Can one suggest a cryptosystem based
on the shortest word problem in B∞, for using its hardness due to
Paterson-Razborov?
(2) Cryptanalysis direction: What is the final status of the shortest
word problem in Bn for a fixed n?
(3) Cryptanalysis direction: What is the hardness of the Shortest Word
Problem in the Birman-Ko-Lee’s presentation?
1.9.3. A cryptosystem based on the Shifted Conjugacy
Search Problem
Dehornoy [30] has suggested an authentication scheme which is based on
the Shifted Conjugacy Search Problem.
Before we describe the scheme, let us define the Shifted Conjugacy
Search Problem. Let x, y ∈ B∞. We define:
x ∗ y = x · dy · σ1 · dx
−1
where dx is the shift of x in B∞, i.e. d is the injective function on B∞
which sends the generator σi to the generator σi+1 for each i ≥ 1. In this
context, the Shifted Conjugacy Search Problem is:
Problem 1.8. Let s, p ∈ B∞ and p′ = s ∗ p. Find a braid s˜ satisfying
p′ = s˜ ∗ p.
Now, the suggested scheme is based on the Fiat-Shamir authentication
scheme: We assume that S is a set and (Fs)s∈S is a family of functions of
S to itself that satisfies the following condition:
Fr(Fs(p)) = FFr(s)(Fr(p)), r, s, p ∈ S
Alice is the prover who wants to convince Bob that she knows the secret
key s. Then the scheme works as follows:
Protocol 1.26.
Public key: Two elements p, p′ ∈ S such that p′ = Fs(p).
Private keys: Alice: s ∈ S.
Alice: Chooses a random r ∈ S and sends Bob x = Fr(p) and x′ =
Fr(p
′).
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Bob: Chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice.
Alice: If c = 0, sends y = r (then Bob checks: x = Fy(p) and x
′ =
Fy(p
′));
If c = 1, sends y = Fr(s) (then Bob checks: x
′ = Fy(x)).
Dehornoy [30] suggests to implement this scheme on Left-
Distributive(LD)-systems. A LD-system is a set S with a binary operation
which satisfies:
r ∗ (s ∗ p) = (r ∗ s) ∗ (r ∗ p).
The Fiat-Shamir-type scheme on LD-systems works as follows:
Protocol 1.27.
Public key: Two elements p, p′ ∈ S such that p′ = s ∗ p.
Private keys: Alice: s ∈ S.
Alice: Chooses a random r ∈ S and sends Bob x = r ∗ p and x′ = r ∗ p′.
Bob: Chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice.
Alice: If c = 0, sends y = r (then Bob checks: x = y ∗p and x′ = y ∗p′);
If c = 1, sends y = r ∗ s (then Bob checks: x′ = y ∗ x).
Now, one can use the shifted conjugacy operation as the ∗ operation
on B∞ in order to get a LD-system. So, in this way, one can achieve an
authentication scheme on the braid group with a non-trivial operation [30].
Remark 1.6. For attacking the Shifted Conjugacy Search Problem, one
cannot use the Summit Sets theory, since it is not a conjugation problem
anymore. Nevertheless, one still can apply on it the length-based attack,
since it is still an equation with x.
Longrigg and Ushakov [84] cryptanalyze the suggestion of Dehornoy, and
they show that they can break the scheme (e.g. 24% of success rate for keys
of length 100 in B40). Their idea is that in general cases they can reduce the
Shifted Conjugacy Search Problem into the well-studied Conjugacy Search
Problem. Based on some simple results, they construct an algorithm for
solving the Shifted Conjugacy Search Problem in two steps:
(1) Find a solution s′ ∈ Bn+1 for the equation p′δ
−1
n+1 = s
′d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1 in
Bn+1. This part can be done using the relevant Ultra Summit Set.
(2) Correct the element s′ ∈ Bn+1 to obtain a solution s ∈ Bn. This can
be done by finding a suitable element c ∈ CBn+1(d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1) (the cen-
tralizer of d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1 in Bn+1).
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The algorithm for computing centralizers presented in [45] is based on
computing the Super Summit Set, which is hard in general (note that
actually the Super Summit Set can be replaced by the Ultra Summit
Set and the Sliding Circuits set in Franco and Gonza´lez-Meneses’ al-
gorithm [60]). Hence, Longrigg and Ushakov use some subgroup of the
centralizer which is much easier to work with.
In the last part of their paper, they discuss possibilities for hard in-
stances for Dehornoy’s scheme, which will resist their attack. Their attack
is based on two ingredients:
(1) The Conjugacy Search Problem is easy for the pair
(p′δ−1n+1, d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1)
in Bn+1.
(2) The centralizer CBn+1(d(p)σ1δ
−1
n+1) is ”small” (i.e. isomorphic to an
Abelian group of small rank).
Hence, if one can find keys for which one of the properties above is not
satisfied, then the attack probably fails.
With respect to this scheme, it is interesting to check (see also [30]):
(1) Cryptanalysis direction: What is the success rate of a length-based
attack on this scheme?
(2) Cryptanalysis direction: Can one develop a theory for the Shifted
Conjugacy Search Problem which will be parallel to the Summit Sets
theory?
(3) Cryptosystem direction: Can one suggest a LD-system on the braid
group, which will be secure for the length-based attack?
(4) Cryptosystem direction: Can one find keys for which the properties
above are not satisfied, and for which Longrigg-Ushakov’s attack fails?
(5) Cryptosystem direction: Can one suggest a LD-system on a differ-
ent group, which will be secure?
1.9.4. Algebraic Eraser
Recently, Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld and
Lemieux [6] introduce a new scheme for a cryptosystem which is based
on combinatorial group theory. We will present here the main ideas of the
scheme and the potential attacks on it.
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1.9.4.1. The scheme and the implementation
We follow the presentation of [69]. Let G be a group acting on a monoidM
on the left, that is, to each g ∈ G and each a ∈ M , we associate a unique
element denoted ga ∈M , such that:
1a = a; gha =g (ha); g(ab) =g a ·g b
for all a, b ∈ M and g, h ∈ G. The set M × G, with the operation (a, g) ◦
(b, h) = (a ·g b, gh) is a monoid, which is denoted by M ⋊G.
Let N be a monoid, and ϕ : M → N a homomorphism. The algebraic
eraser operation is the function ⋆ : (N ×G)× (M ⋊G)→ (N ×G) defined
by:
(a, g) ⋆ (b, h) = (aϕ(gb), gh)
The function ⋆ satisfies the following identity:
((a, g) ⋆ (b, h)) ⋆ (c, r) = (a, g) ⋆ ((b, h) ◦ (c, r))
for all (a, g) ∈ N ×G and (b, h), (c, r) ∈M ⋊G.
We say that two submonoids A,B of M ⋊G are ⋆-commuting if
(ϕ(a), g) ⋆ (b, h) = (ϕ(b), h) ⋆ (a, g)
for all (a, g) ∈ A and (b, h) ∈ B. In particular, if A,B ⋆-commute, then:
ϕ(a)ϕ(gb) = ϕ(b)ϕ(ha) for all (a, g) ∈ A and (b, h) ∈ B.
Based on these settings, Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld and Lemieux suggest
the Algebraic Eraser Key Agreement Scheme. It consists on the following
public information:
(1) A positive integer m.
(2) ⋆-commuting submonoids A,B of M ⋊ G, each given in terms of a
generating set of size k.
(3) Elementwise commuting submonoids C,D of N .
Here is the protocol:
Protocol 1.28.
Alice: Chooses c ∈ C and (a1, g1), . . . , (am, gm) ∈ A, and sends (p, g) =
(c, 1)⋆(a1, g1)⋆ · · ·⋆(am, gm) ∈ N×G (where the ⋆-multiplication is carried
out from left to right) to Bob.
Bob: Chooses d ∈ D and (b1, h1), . . . , (bm, hm) ∈ B, and sends (q, h) =
(d, 1) ⋆ (b1, h1) ⋆ · · · ⋆ (bm, hm) ∈ N ×G to Alice.
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Alice and Bob can compute the shared key:
(cq, h) ⋆ (a1, g1) ⋆ · · · ⋆ (am, gm) = (dp, g) ⋆ (b1, h1) ⋆ · · · ⋆ (bm, hm)
For the reason why it is indeed a shared key, see [6] and [69].
Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld and Lemieux apply their general scheme to
a particular case, which they call Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol
(CBKAP):
Fix a positive integers n and r, and a prime number p. Let G = Sn, the
symmetric group on the n symbols {1, . . . , n}. The group G = Sn acts
on GLn(Fp(t1, . . . , tn)) by permuting the variables {t1, . . . , tn} (note that
in this case the monoid M is in fact a group, and hence, the semi-direct
product M ⋊G also forms a group, with inversion (a, g)−1 = (g
−1
a−1, g−1)
for all (a, g) ∈M ⋊G).
Let N = GLn(Fp). The group M ⋊ Sn is the subgroup of
GLn(Fp(t1, . . . , tn)) ⋊ Sn, generated by (x1, s1), . . . , (xn−1, sn−1), where
si = (i, i + 1), and xi = Ci(ti) (see page 50 above), for i = 2, . . . , n − 1.
Recall that the colored Burau group M ⋊G is a representation of Artin’s
braid group Bn, determined by mapping each Artin generator σi to (xi, si),
i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
ϕ : M → GLn(Fp) is the evaluation map sending each variable ti to a
fixed element τ ∈ Fp. Let C = D = Fp(κ) is the group of matrices of the
form:
ℓ1κ
j1 + · · ·+ ℓrκ
jr ,
with κ ∈ GLn(Fp) of order pn − 1, ℓ1, . . . , ℓr ∈ Fp, and j1, . . . , jr ∈ Z.
Commuting subgroups of M ⋊ G are chosen in a similar way to LBn
and UBn in Section 1.6.2.2. This part is done by a Trusted Third Party
(TTP), before the key-exchange protocol starts.
Fix I1, I2 ⊆ {1, . . . , n−1} such that for all i ∈ I1 and j ∈ I2, |i− j| > 2,
and |I1| and |I2| are both ≤ n/2. Then, define L = 〈σi : i ∈ I1〉 and
U = 〈σj : j ∈ I2〉, subgroups of Bn generated by Artin generators. From
the construction of I1 and I2, L and U commute elementwise. Add to both
groups the central element ∆2 of Bn.
Now, they choose a secret random z ∈ Bn. Next, they choose
w1 = zw
′
1z
−1, . . . , wk = zw
′
kz
−1 ∈ zLz−1 and v1 = zv′1z
−1, . . . , vk =
zv′kz
−1 ∈ zUz−1, each a product of t-many generators. Transform them
into Garside’s normal form, and remove all even powers of ∆. Reuse the
names w1, . . . , wk; v1, . . . , vk for the resulting braids. These braids are made
public.
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Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld and Lemieux have cryptanalyzed their scheme
and the TTP protocol, and conclude that if the conjugating element z is
known, there is a successful linear algebraic attack on CBKAP (see [6,
Section 6]). On the other hand, if z is not known, this attack cannot
be implemented. Moreover, they claim that the length-based attack is
ineffective against CBKAP because wi and vi are not known and for some
more reasons.
1.9.4.2. The attacks
There are several attacks on this cryptosystem. Kalka, Teicher and Tsaban
[69] attack the general scheme and then show that the attack can be applied
to CBKAP, the specific implementation of the scheme.
For the general scheme, they show that the secret part of the shared
key can be computed (under some assumptions, which also include the
assumption that the keys are chosen with standard distributions). They do
it in two steps: First they compute d and ϕ(b) up to a scalar, and using
that they can compute the secret part of the shared key. They remark that
if the keys are chosen by a distribution different from the standard, it is
possible that this attack is useless (see [69, Section 8] for a discussion on
this point).
In the next part, they show that the assumptions are indeed satisfied
for the specific implementation of the scheme. The first two assumptions
(that it is possible to generate an element (α, 1) ∈ A with α 6= 1, and that
N is a subgroup of GLn(F) for some field F and some n) can be easily
checked. The third assumption (that given an element g ∈ 〈s1, . . . , sk〉,
where (a1, s1), . . . , (ak, sk) ∈ M ⋊G are the given generators of A, then g
can be explicitly expressed as a product of elements of {s±1 , . . . , s
±
k }), can
be reformulated as the Membership Search Problem in generic permutation
groups :
Problem 1.9. Given random s1, . . . , sk ∈ Sn and s ∈ 〈s1, . . . , sk〉, ex-
press s as a short (i.e. of polynomial length) product of elements from
{s±1 , . . . , s
±
k }.
They provide a simple and very efficient heuristic algorithm for solving
this problem in generic permutation groups. The algorithm gives expres-
sions of length O(n2 log(n)), in time O(n4 log(n)) and space O(n2 log(n)),
and is the first practical one for n ≥ 256. Hence, the third assumption is
satisfied too. So the attack can be applied to the CBKAP implementation.
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Myasnikov and Ushakov [101] attack the scheme of Anshel, Anshel,
Goldfeld and Lemieux from a different direction. Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld
and Lemieux [6] discuss the security of their scheme and indicate that if
the conjugator z generated randomly by the TTP algorithm is known, then
one can attack their scheme by an efficient linear attack, which can reveal
the shared key of the parties. The problem of recovering the exact z seems
like a very difficult mathematical problem since it reduces to solving the
system of equations: 

w1 = ∆
2p1zw′1z
−1
...
wk = ∆
2pkzw′kz
−1
v1 = ∆
2r1zv′1z
−1
...
vk = ∆
2rkzv′kz
−1
,
which has too many unknowns, since only the left hand sides are known.
Hence, it might be difficult to find the original z.
The attack of Myasnikov and Ushakov is a variant of the length-based
attack. It is based on the observation that actually any solution z′ for the
system of equations above can be used in a linear attack on the scheme.
Hence, they start by recovering the powers of ∆ which were added, so one
can peel the ∆2p part. In the next step, they succeed in revealing the
conjugator z (or any equivalent solution z′).
Experimental results with instances of the TTP protocol generated us-
ing |z| = 50 (which is almost three times greater than the suggested value)
showed 100% success rate. They indicate that the attack may fail when the
length of z is large relative to the length of ∆2 (for more details, see [101,
Section 3.4]).
Chowdhury [27] shows that the suggested implementation of the Alge-
braic Eraser scheme to the braid group (the TTP protocol) is actually based
on the Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem, and then it can
be cracked. He gives some algorithms for attacking the implementation.
It will be interesting to continue the research on the Algebraic Eraser
key-agreement scheme in several directions:
(1) Cryptosystem direction: Can one suggest a different distribution
for the choice of keys, so the cryptosystem can resist the attack of
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Kalka-Teicher-Tsaban?
(2) Cryptosystem direction: Can one suggest a different implementa-
tion (different groups, etc.) for the Algebraic Eraser scheme which can
resist the attack of Kalka-Teicher-Tsaban?
(3) Cryptanalysis direction: Can the usual length-based approach [48]
be applied to attack the TTP protocol?
(4) General: One should perform a rigorous analysis of the algorithm of
Kalka-Teicher-Tsaban for the Membership Search Problem in generic
permutation groups (see [69, Section 8]).
1.9.5. Cryptosystems based on the decomposition problem
and the triple decomposition problem
This section deals with two cryptosystems which are based on different
variants of the decomposition problem: Given a, b = xay ∈ G, find x, y.
Shpilrain and Ushakov [113] suggest the following protocol, which is
based on the decomposition problem:
Protocol 1.29.
Public key: w ∈ G.
Alice: chooses an element a1 ∈ G of length ℓ, chooses a subgroup of the
centralizer CG(a1), and publishes its generators A = {α1, . . . , αk}.
Bob: chooses an element b2 ∈ G of length ℓ, chooses a subgroup of
CG(b2), and publishes its generators B = {β1, . . . , βm}.
Alice: chooses a random element a2 ∈ 〈B〉 and sends publicly the normal
form PA = N(a1wa2) to Bob.
Bob: chooses a random element b1 ∈ 〈A〉 and sends publicly the normal
form PB = N(b1wb2) to Alice.
Shared secret key: KA = a1PBa2 = b1PAb2 = KB.
Since a1b1 = b1a1 and a2b2 = b2a2, we indeed have K = KA = KB, the
shared secret key. Alice can compute KA and Bob can compute KB.
They suggest the following values of parameters for the protocol: G =
B64, ℓ = 1024. For computing the centralizers, Alice and Bob should
use the algorithm from [45], but actually they have to compute only some
elements from them and not the whole sets.
Two key-exchange protocols which are based on a variant of the de-
composition problem have been suggested by Kurt [75]. We describe here
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the second protocol which is an extension of the protocol of Shpilrain and
Ushakov to the triple decomposition problem:
Problem 1.10. Given v = x−11 a2x2, find x1 ∈ H, a2 ∈ A and x2 ∈ H
′
where H = CG(g1, . . . , gk1), H
′ = CG(g
′
1, . . . , g
′
k2
), and A is a subgroup of
G given by its generators.
Here is Kurt’s second protocol (his first protocol is similar): Let G be
a non-commutative monoid with a large number of invertible elements.
Protocol 1.30.
Alice: picks two invertible elements x1, x2 ∈ G, chooses subsets Sx1 ⊆
CG(x1) and Sx2 ⊆ CG(x2), and publishes Sx1 and Sx2 .
Bob: picks two invertible elements y1, y2 ∈ G, chooses subsets Sy1 ⊆
CG(y1) and Sy2 ⊆ CG(y2), and publishes Sy1 and Sy2 .
Alice: chooses random elements a1 ∈ G, a2 ∈ Sy1 and a3 ∈ Sy2 as
her private keys. She sends Bob publicly (u, v, w) where u = a1x1, v =
x−11 a2x2, w = x
−1
2 a3.
Bob: chooses random elements b1 ∈ Sx1 , b2 ∈ Sx2 and b3 ∈ G as
his private keys. He sends Alice publicly (p, q, r) where p = b1y1, q =
y−11 b2y2, r = y
−1
2 b3.
Shared secret key: K = a1b1a2b2a3b3.
Indeed, K is a shared key, since Alice can compute a1pa2qa3r =
a1b1a2b2a3b3 and Bob can compute ub1vb2wb3 = a1b1a2b2a3b3.
As parameters, Kurt suggests to use G = B100 and each secret key
should be of length 300 Artin generators.
Chowdhury [26] attacks the two protocols of Kurt, by observing that by
some manipulations one can gather the secret information by solving only
the Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem. Hence, the security
of Kurt’s protocols is based on the solution of the Multiple Simultaneous
Conjugacy Search Problem. Since the Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy
Search Problem can be attacked by several methods, Chowdhury has actu-
ally shown that Kurt’s protocols are not secure.
Although Shpilrain and Ushakov indicate that their key-exchange
scheme resists length-based attack, it will be interesting to check if this
indeed is the situation. Also, it is interesting to check if one can change
the secrets of Kurt’s protocols in such a way that it cannot be revealed by
just solving the Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem. If such a change
exists, one should check if the new scheme resists length-based attacks.
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1.10. Future directions I: Alternate distributions
In this section and in the next section, we discuss some more future direc-
tions of research in this area and related areas. This section deals the in-
teresting option of changing the distribution of the generators. In this way,
one can increase the security of cryptosystems which are vulnerable when
assuming a standard distribution. In the next section, we deal with some
suggestions of cryptosystems which are based on different non-commutative
groups, apart from the braid group.
For overcoming some of the attacks, one can try to change the distribu-
tion of the generators. For example, one can require that if the generator
σi appears, then in the next place we give more probability for the appear-
ance of σi±1. In general, such a situation is called a Markov walk, i.e. the
distribution of the choice of the next generator depends on the choice of
the current chosen generator.
A work in this direction is the paper of Maffre [88]. After suggesting
a deterministic polynomial algorithm that reduces the Conjugacy Search
Problem in braid group (by a partial factorization of the secret), he proposes
a new random generator of keys which is secure against his attack and the
one of Hofheinz and Steinwandt [65].
This situation appears also in the Algebraic Eraser scheme (Section
1.9.4). The attack of Kalka, Teicher and Tsaban [69] assumes that the
distribution of the generators is standard. They indicate that if the distri-
bution is not standard, it is possible that the attack fails.
1.11. Future directions II: Cryptosystems based on different
non-commutative groups
The protocols presented here for the braid groups can be applied to other
non-commutative groups, so the natural question here is:
Problem 1.11. Can one suggest a different non-commutative group where
the existing protocols on the braid group can be applied, and the cryptosys-
tem will be secure?
We survey here some suggestions.
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1.11.1. Thompson group
When some of the cryptosystems on the braid groups were attacked, it was
natural to look for different groups, with a hope that a similar cryptosys-
tem on a different group will be more secure and more successful. The
Thompson group is a natural candidate for such a group: there is a normal
form which can computed efficiently, but the decomposition problem seems
difficult. On this base, Shpilrain and Ushakov [112] suggest a cryptosystem.
In this section, we will define the Thompson group, the Shpilrain-
Ushakov cryptosystem, and we discuss its cryptanalysis.
1.11.1.1. Definitions and the Shpilrain-Ushakov cryptosystem
Thompson’s group F is the infinite non-commutative group defined by the
following generators and relations:
F = 〈 x0, x1, x2, . . . | x
−1
i xkxi = xk+1 (k > i) 〉
Each w ∈ F admits a unique normal form [22]:
w = xi1 · · ·xirx
−1
jt
· · ·x−1j1 ,
where i1 ≤ · · · ≤ ir, j1 ≤ · · · ≤ jt, and if xi and x
−1
i both occur in this
form, then either xi+1 or x
−1
i+1 occurs as well. The transformation of an
element of F into its normal form is very efficient [112].
We define here a natural length function on the Thompson group:
Definition 1.31. The normal form length of an element w ∈ F , LNF(w),
is the number of generators in its normal form: If w = xi1 · · ·xirx
−1
jt
· · ·x−1j1
is in normal form, then LNF(w) = r + t.
Shpilrain and Ushakov [112] suggest the following key-exchange protocol
based on the Thompson group:
Protocol 1.32.
Public subgroups: A,B,W of F , where ab = ba for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B
Public key: a braid w ∈ W .
Private keys: Alice: a1 ∈ A, b1 ∈ B; Bob: a2 ∈ A, b2 ∈ B.
Alice: Sends Bob u1 = a1wb1.
Bob: Sends Alice u2 = b2wa2
Shared secret key: K = a1b2wa2b1
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K is a shared key since Alice can compute K = a1u2b1 and Bob can
compute K = b2u1a2, and both are equal to K since a1, a2 commute with
b1, b2.
Here is a suggestion for implementing the cryptosystem [112]: Fix a nat-
ural number s ≥ 2. Let SA = {x0x
−1
1 , . . . , x0x
−1
s }, SB = {xs+1, . . . , x2s}
and SW = {x0, . . . , xs+2}. Denote by A, B and W the subgroups of F gen-
erated by SA, SB, and SW , respectively. A and B commute elementwise,
as required.
The keys a1, a2 ∈ A, b1, b2 ∈ B and w ∈ W are all chosen of normal
form length L, where L is a fixed integer, as follows: Let X be A, B or
W . Start with the unit word, and multiply it on the right by a (uniformly)
randomly selected generator, inverted with probability 12 , from the set SX .
Continue this procedure until the normal form of the word has length L.
For practical implementation of the protocol, it is suggested in [112] to
use s ∈ {3, 4, . . . , 8} and L ∈ {256, 258, . . . , 320}.
1.11.1.2. Length-based attack
We present some attacks on the Ushakov-Shpilrain cryptosystem.
As mentioned before, the length-based attack is applicable for any group
with a reasonable length function. Ruinskiy, Shamir and Tsaban [108]
applied this attack to the Thompson group.
As before, the basic length-based attack without memory always fails for
the suggested parameters. If we add the memory approach, there is some
improvement: for a memory of size 1024, there is 11% success. But if the
memory is small (up to 64), even the memory approach always fails. They
suggest that the reason for this phenomenon (in contrast to a significant
success for the length-based attack with memory on the braid group) is
that the braid group is much closer to the free group than the Thompson
group, which is relatively close to an abelian group.
Their improvement is trying to avoid repetitions. The problem is that
many elements return over and over again, and hence the algorithm goes
into loops which make its way to the solution much difficult. The solution
of this is holding a list of the already-checked conjugators, and when we
generate a new conjugator, we check in the list if it has already appeared
(this part is implemented by a hash table). In case of appearance, we just
ignore it. This improvement increases significantly the success rate of the
algorithm: instead of 11% for a memory of size 1024, we now have 49.8%,
and instead of 0% for a memory of size 64, we now have 24%.
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In the same paper [108], they suggest some more improvements for
the length-based algorithm. One of their reasons for continuing with the
improvements is the following interesting fact which was pointed out by
Shpilrain [111]: there is a very simple fix for key-agreement protocols that
are broken in probability less than p: Agree on k independent keys in
parallel, and XOR them all to obtain the shared key. The probability of
breaking the shared key is at most pk, which is much smaller.
In a different paper, Ruinskiy, Shamir and Tsaban [116] attack the key
agreement protocols based on non-commutative groups from a different
direction: by using functions that estimate the distance of a group element
to a given subgroup. It is known that in general the Membership Problem
is hard, but one can use some heuristic approaches for determining the
distance of an element to a given subgroup, e.g., to count the number of
generators which are not in the subgroup.
They test it against the Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol, which is based on
Thompson’s group F , and show that it can break about half the keys within
a few seconds.
1.11.1.3. Special attack by Matucci
Some interesting special attack for the Ushakov-Shpilrain cryptosystem can
be found in Kassabov and Matucci [91] and Mattuci [90].
1.11.2. Polycyclic groups
Eick and Kahrobaei [41] suggest to use polycyclic groups as the basis of a
cryptosystem. These groups are a natural generalization of cyclic groups,
but they are much more complex in their structure than cyclic groups.
Hence, their algorithmic theory is more difficult and thus it seems promising
to investigate classes of polycyclic groups as candidates to have a more
substantial platform perhaps more secure.
Here is one presentation for polycyclic groups:
〈a1, . . . , an | a
−1
i
ajai = wij, aiaja
−1
i
= vij, a
rk
k
= ukk, for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, k ∈ I〉
where I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and ri ∈ N if i ∈ I and the right hand sides
wij , vij , ujj of the relations are words in the generators aj+1, . . . , an. Using
induction, it is straightforward to show that every element in the group de-
fined by this presentation can be written in the form ae11 · · · a
en
n with ei ∈ Z
and 0 ≤ ei < ri if i ∈ I (see [119] for more information).
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Eick and Kahrobaei introduce a Diffie-Hellman-type key-exchange which
is based on the polycyclic group. As in the braid groups’ case, the cryp-
tosystem is based on the fact that the word problem can be solved effectively
in polycyclic groups, while the known solutions to the conjugacy problem
are far less efficient. For more information, see [41].
In a different direction, Kahrobaei and Khan [68] introduce a non-
commutative key-exchange scheme which generalizes the classical El-Gamal
Cipher [42] to polycyclic groups.
1.11.3. Miller groups
Mahalanobis [89] suggested some Diffie-Hellman-type exchange key on
Miller Groups [92], which are groups with an abelian automorphism group.
1.11.4. Grigorchuk group
Garzon and Zalcstein [52] suggest a cryptosystem which is based on the
word problem of the Grigorchuk group [62]. Both Petrides [105] and
Gonza´lez-Vasco, Hofheinz, Martinez and Steinwandt [61] cryptanalyze this
cryptosystem.
The Conjugacy Decision Problem in this group is also polynomial [85],
so this problem cannot be served as a base for a cryptosystem.
1.11.5. Twisted conjugacy problem in the semigroup of 2×2
matrices over polynomials
Shpilrain and Ushakov [114] suggest an authentication scheme which is
based on the twisted conjugacy search problem:
Problem 1.12. Given a pair of endomorphisms (i.e., homomorphisms into
itself) ϕ, ψ of a group G and a pair of elements w, t ∈ G, find an element
s ∈ G such that t = ψ(s−1)wϕ(s) provided at least one such s exists.
Their suggested platform semigroup G is the semigroup of all 2 × 2
matrices over truncated one-variable polynomials over F2, the field of two
elements. For more details, see their paper.
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